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WHEN DAUBERT GETS ERIE: MEDICAL CERTAINTY AND
MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL COURT
ROBIN KUNDIs CRAIG*
SUMMARY
When the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in 1993, it changed the process and standards
for admitting expert testimony in federal court. Since that decision, most
federal courts have assumed that the Daubert analysis is the only stan-
dard governing the admissibility of expert testimony in federal court-
even in diversity medical malpractice and medical products liability
cases. However, Daubert did not modify, or even significantly discuss,
the Erie doctrine, leaving questions unanswered regarding the
admissibility of expert medical testimony when federal courts sit in
diversity. In particular, states often impose medical certainty
requirements on expert medical testimony that can affect that testimony's
admissibility, the expert's competence to testify, or the plaintiff's burden
of proof. This article argues that because these state medical certainty
standards generally are substantive enough under Erie to apply in
diversity cases and do not directly conflict with the Federal Rules of
Evidence or the Daubert analysis, federal courts sitting in diversity
should apply the relevant state standard as well as the Daubert analysis
in diversity cases that involve medical experts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Medical malpractice cases and certain kinds of medicine-related
products liability cases-those involving pharmaceutical drugs or medi-
cal devices, for example-generally require expert medical testimony on
the issue of causation: can, and did, the doctor, drug, or device cause the
plaintiff's injuries? In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' and established a new analysis pur-
suant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 for the admissibility of expert
medical testimony on causation in federal court. Under the Daubert rul-
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1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. Rule 702 provides that: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
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ing, a federal trial judge "must ensure that any and all scientific testi-
mony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."3 The focus
of a Daubert analysis is on an expert's methodology, not on his or her
conclusions 4-that is, Daubert asks whether the proffered testimony is
grounded in scientific knowledge, not whether it is sufficient to prove
plaintiff's case.'
Federal court medical malpractice and products liability cases, how-
ever, are almost always diversity cases asserting state law claims,6 and
state law often imposes special standards of certainty for the reliability of
expert medical testimony. In some states, medical experts must testify
"to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,"7 while in others they must
testify "to a reasonable degree of medical probability,"' that the doctor,
drug, or device caused the plaintiff's injury or condition. Throughout this
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
3. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
4. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
5. See id. at 589-90, 595.
6. See, e.g., Goldman v. Bosco, 120 F.3d 53, 54 (5th Cir. 1997); Hall v. Dow Coming Corp.,
114 F.3d 73, 78 (5th Cir. 1997); Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184,
189 (1st Cir. 1997). The most common exception is medical malpractice cases against medical
personnel who are federal government employees, such as hospital personnel at Veterans
Administration hospitals. These claims are only cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994), and thus are matters of federal question. The Supreme Court, however, has
construed the Tort Claims Act as requiring federal courts to apply state law. Molzof v. United States,
502 U.S. 301, 305 (1992) (citing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153 (1963); Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6-7, 11 (1962); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318-19
(1957); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65, 68-69 (1955); United States v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 370 (1949)). Several federal circuits have explicitly extended
this principle to medical malpractice actions against federal employees. Zuchowicz v. United States,
140 F.3d 381, 387 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Taylor v. United States, 121 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1997));
Abraham v. United States, 932 F.2d 900, 902 (1 lth Cir. 1991); Campbell v. United States, 904 F.2d
1188, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990); Jackson v. United States, 881 F.2d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Shaw
v. United States, 741 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1984)); Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1243
(6th Cir. 1988) (citing Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318-20 (1957)); LeMaire v.
United States, 826 F.2d 949, 953 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Holler v. United States, 724 F.2d 104, 105
(10th Cir. 1983); Collins v. United States, 708 F.2d 499, 500 (10th Cir. 1983)); Ayers v. United
States, 750 F.2d 449, 452 n.l (5th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 152-53
(1963); Edwards v. United States, 519 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 972
(1976)); Tyminski v. United States, 481 F.2d 257, 262-63 (3d Cir. 1973) (citing Kington v. United
States, 396 F.2d 9, 11 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 960 (1968); Kossick v. United States,
330 F.2d 933, 935-36 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 837 (1964); Hungerford v. United
States, 307 F.2d 99, 101-02 (9th Cir. 1962); Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234, 235-40 (5thCir.
1962)). Therefore, state law only rarely does not govern a medical malpractice case.
7. See, e.g., Richmond Police Dep't v. Bass, 493 S.E.2d 661, 667 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that plaintiff failed to show that job stress caused his heart disease when no doctor "opined
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that job stress was a causative factor in the disease
claimant suffered").
8. See, e.g., Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 211 (S.C. 1998) (holding that a doctor was not
qualified to testify as to causation when he could not say that any medication most probably caused
the plaintiffs tinnitus).
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article these standards are referred to collectively as "state medical cer-
tainty standards." State courts will generally exclude expert medical tes-
timony that does not meet the applicable medical certainty standard. As a
result, the Erie doctrine presents a potential wrinkle for the Daubert
analysis regarding medical expert testimony in federal court.9 Under
Erie, federal courts hearing state-law claims must apply state substantive
law. Should a federal court sitting in diversity admit expert medical testi-
mony that satisfies Daubert if that testimony does not meet the state-law
medical certainty standard?
Most federal courts to date have answered that question in the nega-
tive, deeming Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert the exclusive
measures of whether a medical expert's testimony is admissible, even in
diversity cases.'" This article explores the various kinds of certainty stan-
dards that states impose on medical expert testimony, the Erie ramifica-
tions of those standards, the Daubert analysis in federal court, and the
intersection of Daubert gate keeping and state-law medical certainty. It
will illustrate that the most difficult issues arise when a state medical
certainty standard governs the admissibility of expert medical testimony,
but it argues that because state standards rarely conflict absolutely with
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or the Daubert screening requirements,
federal courts can, and should, apply those standards in conjunction with
their Daubert analysis, in keeping with the Supreme Court's most recent
Erie jurisprudence.
II. STATE MEDICAL CERTAINTY STANDARDS
Medical malpractice and products liability are two common state-
law causes of action that plaintiffs use when they have been injured in
the course of medical treatment. Both require the plaintiff to prove that
the alleged problem-the doctor's technique, a medical device's design,
a drug's side effect-is medically capable of causing the plaintiffs in-
jury. Thus, in both medical malpractice and products liability cases, cau-
sation-the link between the doctor, drug, or device at issue and the
harm or injury complained of-is critical for a plaintiff trying to prove
his or her case, particularly if the link between the alleged cause and the
injury is not obvious or generally accepted. As one court has noted, "[n]o
matter how negligent a party may have been, if his negligent act bears no
relation to the injury, it is not actionable.""
9. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (establishing that federal courts sitting
in diversity must apply state substantive law, both statutes and common law). See also Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965) (holding that whether the choice between state and federal law
is outcome determinative should be viewed with respect to whether the choice leads forum shopping
and the inequitable application of laws); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945)
(holding that state law applies in diversity cases if the choice of law is outcome determinative).
10. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1042 (2d Cir. 1995).
11. Shegog v. Zabrecky, 654 A.2d 771, 776 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
1999]
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Unlike many kinds of tort cases, medical malpractice and products
liability cases can involve two levels of causation issues: general causa-
tion and specific causation." To prove specific causation, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant doctor's negligence or the defendant manu-
facturer's defective drug or device caused the plaintiff's injury.3 General
causation, on the other hand, presents the issue of whether the alleged
cause is capable of ever causing the alleged injury to anyone." If a drug is
incapable of causing cancer, for example, neither doctors nor manufacturers
can be liable for a plaintiff's cancer regardless of their conduct in relation to
that drug. When applicable, therefore, lack of general causation can be a basic
defense in medical malpractice and products liability suits.
Most states require that plaintiffs prove medical causation through
expert testimony'5 unless it is obvious to a layperson that a problem
12. See, e.g., Raynor v. Merrell Pharm. Inc., 104 F.3d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1997); In re Joint E. &
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995).
13. See, e.g., Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999).
14. See, e.g., Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 669 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming the
lower court's finding of general causation by outlining the presented evidence of the hazards of
benzene to establish a sufficient causal connection between benzene and the claimed injuries);
Snyder v. Upjohn Co., 172 F.3d 58 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that evidence of general causation cannot
be used to establish cause and effect); Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 135 (3d Cir.
1998) (noting that proof of general causation does not prove individual causation for tobacco class
action members); Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding
that testimony on specific causation has legitimacy only after admissible evidence shows that the
drug in question is generally capable of causing birth defects); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 52 F.3d at 1131 (stating that the first element of causation that must be established in a toxic
tort action is general causation, or the causal link between the implicated product and the claimed
injury); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 797-800 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding that defendant's
failure to disclose that an expert witness would be testifying to both general and specific causation
resulted in prejudice requiring a reversal and remand); Heller, 167 F.3d at 155 (stating that "a
medical expert [need not] always cite published studies on general causation in order to reliably
conclude that a particular object caused a particular illness.").
15. See e.g., University of Ala. Health Servs. Found. v. Bush, 638 So. 2d 794 (Ala. 1994));
Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co., 31 Cal. App. 4th 1409, 1416 (Cal. Ct. App.1995); Kunst v.
Vitale, 680 A.2d 339, 343-44 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Money v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease
Compensation Trust Fund, 596 A.2d 1372, 1377 (Del. 1991); Woldeamanuel v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 703 A.2d 1243, 1244 (D.C. 1997); McNeil Pharm. v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 582-83 (D.C.
1996); Duran v. Cullinan, 677 N.E.2d 999, 1010 (Il1. App. Ct. 1997); Northern Trust Co. v. Upjohn
Co., 572 N.E.2d 1030, 1036, 1038-40 (I11. App. Ct. 1991); Daub v. Daub, 629 N.E.2d 873, 878 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1994); Bazel v. Mabee, 576 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (citing Thomas v.
Fellows, 456 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa 1990)); Hare v. Wendler, 949 P.2d 1141, 1143, 1145 (Kan.
1997); Russo v. Bratton, 657 So. 2d 777, 785 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Lally v. Volkswagen
Aktiengesellschaft, 698 N.E.2d 28, 36 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); Rohde v. Lawrence Gen. Hosp., 614
N.E.2d 686, 688 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); Palmer v. Biloxi Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 564 So. 2d 1346,
1364 (Miss. 1990); Brickey v. Concerned Care, 988 S.W.2d 592, 596-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999);
Lashmet v. McQueary, 954 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Doe v. Zedek, 587 N.W.2d 885,
891 (Neb. 1999); Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 107-08 (Nev. 1998); Jacques v. New
York, 487 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1984); Hightower-Warren v. Silk, 698 A.2d 52. 54 (Pa.
1997); Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 705 A.2d 1314, 1321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Fulton v.
Pfizer Hosp. Prod. Group, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); Burroughs Wellcome
Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995); Greene v. Thiet, 846 S.W.2d 26, 33 (Tex. App.
1993); Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Reeves v. Geigy
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would have occurred. 6 State standards governing expert medical testi-
mony and medical causation, however, vary. In some jurisdictions, such
as Pennsylvania, the expert must be able to testify "to a reasonable de-
gree of medical certainty" that the doctor's or manufacturer's actions
caused the plaintiffs injuries." Other jurisdictions, like Virginia, simi-
larly use a "reasonable degree of medical certainty" standard, but apply it
more broadly to the plaintiff s overall burden of proof.'"
More commonly, the standard is some form of medical probability
that can again apply either to the expert's testimony or to the plaintiff's
overall burden of proof.'9 In Ohio medical malpractice cases, for exam-
ple, "the plaintiff must prove causation through medical expert testimony
in terms of probability to establish that the injury was, more likely than
not, caused by the defendant's negligence."20 In Connecticut, experts
must testify to a standard of "reasonable degree of medical probability;"
2'
in South Carolina, the medical expert must testify that the purported
cause "most probably" caused the plaintiffs injury; 22 and in Massachu-
Pharm., Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Bruns v. PACCAR, Inc., 890 P.2d 469, 477
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Guile v. Ballard Community Hosp., 851 P.2d 689, 693 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993).
16. See, e.g., Bowman v. Beghin, 713 N.E.2d 913, 916 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Bazel, 576
N.W.2d at 387; Hare, 949 P.2d at 1147; Lally, 698 N.E.2d at 35-36; Rohde, 614 N.E.2d at 688;
Brickey, 988 S.W.2d at 596; Cobo v. Raba, 495 S.E.2d 362, 366 (N.C. 1998); Morgan v.
Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex. 1984).
17. See, e.g., Robinson v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 691 A.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Wilder v. Eberhart, 977 F.2d 673, 676 n.2 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying New Hampshire law); Wingo v.
Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 686 N.E.2d 722, 734 (111. App. Ct. 1997); Soper v. Bopp, 990 S.W.2d 147,
150-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Jacques v. New York, 487 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1984);
Smith v. Grab, 705 A.2d 894, 899 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
18. Richmond Police Dep't v. Bass, 493 S.E.2d 661, 667 (Va. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd on other
grounds, 515 S.E.2d 557 (Va. 1999) ("[C]Iaimant had the burden of establishing by clear and
convincing evidence, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that his condition arose out of and
in the course of his employment.").
19. See, e.g., Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1286 (N.M. 1999) (noting that proximate
cause must be shown to a reasonable degree of medical probability); McKellips v. Saint Francis
Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 471 (Okla. 1987) (noting that the medical probability standard applies to
the whole case); LeNotre v. Cohen, 979 S.W.2d 723, 729 (Tex. App. 1998) (noting that proximate
cause must be shown to a reasonable degree of medical probability).
20. Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ohio 1996). Accord
Bobo, 706 So. 2d at 765; Owens Coming v. Bauman, 726 A.2d 745, 767 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999);
Taylor v. Medenica, 479 S.E.2d 35, 43 n.10 (S.C. 1996).
21. Borkowski v. Sacheti, 682 A.2d 1095, 1099 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996). Accord Eisenbach v.
Downey, 694 A.2d 1376, 1384 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997); Bondi v. Pole, 587 A.2d 285, 287 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Dolen v. St. Mary's Hosp., 506 S.E.2d 624, 628 n.10 (W. Va. 1998).
22. Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 211 (S.C. 1998). "Before expert medical testimony is
admissible on the question of causation between the plaintiffs injuries and the acts of the defendant,
the testimony must satisfy the 'most probably' rule." Id. The "most probably rule" states:
It is not sufficient for the expert... to testify merely that the ailment might or could have
resulted from the alleged cause. He must go further and testify that taking into
consideration all the data it is his professional opinion that the result in question most
probably came for the cause alleged.
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setts the expert must testify "that the purported cause, more probably
than not, caused the injury."2 Texas does not require that individual
medical experts testify to the reasonable medical probability standard,
but "the substance of the evidence must show a reasonable probability"
to support an ultimate finding of causation.24
Jurisdictions requiring individual medical experts to meet either the
reasonable medical certainty or medical probability standard do not usu-
ally require experts to use those "magic words" in their testimony.25
However, these courts will usually exclude the expert's testimony if the
expert will only testify as to possibilities.26
Finally, some jurisdictions use a "substantial factor" standard,
which takes two forms: (1) the "substantial factor" requirement modifies
"reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable medical probability"; or,
(2) the entire standard is the "substantial factor" test. These tests can be
phrased many ways. For example, the California Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff may prove causation by showing that the alleged cause
Baughman v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 410 S.E.2d 537 (S.C. 1991). The standard changes slightly
when a plaintiff "relies solely upon the opinion of medical experts to establish a causal connection
between the alleged negligence and the injury." In that case, the experts must, "with reasonable
certainty, state that in their professional opinion, the injuries complained of most probably resulted
from the defendant's negligence." Ellis v. Oliver, 473 S.E.2d 793, 795 (S.C. 1996) (emphasis
added).
23. Cusher v. Turner, 495 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
24. Purina Mills, Inc. v. Odell, 948 S.W.2d 927, 938 (Tex. App. 1997). But see Hemandez v.
Calle, 963 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. App. 1998) (stating that in summary judgment, expert testimony
as to causation must be based on reasonable medical probability).
25. E.g., Kunnanz v. Edge, 515 N.W.2d 167, 173 (N.D. 1994) ("Hypertechnical words are not
necessary for the admission of an expert medical opinion; the test for admissibility is whether the
expert's testimony demonstrates the expert is expressing a medical opinion that is more probable, or
more likely than not."); Welsh v. Bulger, 698 A.2d 581, 585-86 (Pa. 1997) ("We do not, however,
require experts to use 'magic words' when expressing their opinions. . . . Instead, we look at the
substance of their testimony."); Weber v. McCoy, 950 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo. 1998) ("Wyoming does
not require that an expert use the magic words 'reasonable medical probability' in order for his
opinion to be considered a competent medical opinion.").
26. See, e.g., Abdul-Majeed v. Emory Univ. Hosp., 484 S.E.2d 257, 258 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that "a possibility that the alleged negligence caused the death is not sufficient to establish
proximate cause .... Certainty is not required, but the plaintiff must show a probability rather than
merely a possibility that that alleged negligence caused the injury or death."); Koontz v. Ferber, 870
S.W.2d 885, 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a "physician's opinion that the lab reading 'may'
reflect acidosis is not the same as an opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the lab
reading does reflect acidosis" and therefore that exclusion of the testimony was not an abuse of
discretion); Kunnanz, 515 N.W.2d at 172 (noting that expert medical opinions must "be expressed in
terms of reasonable medical certainty or probability, not mere possibility."); Vitrano v. Schiffman,
702 A.2d 1347, 1351 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) ("'[M]edical opinion testimony must be
couched in terms of reasonable medical certainty or probability; opinions as to possibility are
inadmissible."') (quoting Johnesee v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 416 A.2d 956 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1980)); McKellips, 741 P.2d at 471 (holding that in proving causation in a medical malpractice
action, "[a]bsolute certainty is not required," but "mere possibility or speculation is insufficient");
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Kendrick, 491 S.E.2d 286, 287 (Va. 1997) (holding that a medical
opinion based on "possibility" is inadmissible).
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was, to a reasonable medical probability, a substantial factor in contrib-
uting to the plaintiff's injury.27 Other jurisdictions, such as New Jersey,
use the substantial factor test for all causation issues." In the First Cir-
cuit's formulation of this test, "the plaintiff can carry her burden by
showing a 'substantial possibility' that the harm would have been averted
had the defendant acted in a non-negligent manner. 29 So phrased, the
substantial factor test imposes a far less taxing burden on plaintiffs than
either medical certainty or medical probability."
Beyond their sheer variety, state medical certainty standards create
several potential interpretive pitfalls when plaintiffs file their medical
malpractice or products liability actions in federal court. First, states dif-
fer regarding the exact evidentiary consequence of meeting-or not
meeting-their medical certainty standards. In some states, the standard
determines whether an individual medical expert's testimony is admissi-
ble.' In other states, the standard governs the expert's competency to
testify. 2 Finally, as previously noted, in some states the medical certainty
standard defines the overall burden of proof for a medical malpractice or
27. See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1219 (Cal. 1997):
Plaintiffs may prove causation in asbestos-related cancer cases by demonstrating that the
plaintiffs exposure to defendant's asbestos-containing product in reasonable medical
probability was a substantial factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of asbestos the
plaintiff inhaled or ingested, and hence to the risk of developing asbestos-related cancer,
without the need to demonstrate that fibers from the defendant's particular product were
the ones, or among the ones, that actually produced the malignant growth.
Id. See also Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co., 31 Cal. Rptr. 902, 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) ("In
evaluating whether exposure was a substantial factor in causing asbestos disease, the standard should
be the same as used in other cases: is there a reasonable medical probability based upon competent
expert testimony that the defendant's conduct contributed to plaintiff's injury.").
28. See Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying New
Jersey law). See also Roses v. Feldman, 608 A.2d 383, 385-86 (N.J, Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
(noting that in medical malpractice cases, the jury decides whether the deviation in care is a
substantial factor in producing the injury but requiring medical experts to testify to a reasonable
degree of medical probability whether this deviation increased the risk of harm) (citing Battenfeld v.
Gregory, 589 A.2d 1059, 1063-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)).
29. Blinzler, 81 F.3d at 1152 (citing Hake v. Manchester, 486 A.2d 836, 839 (N.J. 1985)).
30. See Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1219 ("The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad
one, requiring only that the contribution of an individual cause be more than negligible or
theoretical.").
31. See, e.g., Smith v. Milfield, 869 P.2d 748, 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Schrantz v.
Luancing, 527 A.2d 967, 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986); Koontz v. Ferber, 870 S.W.2d 885,
890 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 211 (S.C. 1998); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. v. Kendrick, 491 S.E.2d 286, 287 (Va. 1997); Reese v. Stroh, 907 P.2d 282, 286 (Wash. 1995)
(en banc).
32. See, e.g., Eisenbach v. Downey, 694 A.2d 1376, 1383-84 (Conn. Ct. App. 1997). See also
Joyce v. Boulevard Physical Therapy & Rehabilitation Ctr., 694 A.2d 648, 655 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)
(stating that in Pennsylvania, "if a witness has an reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on
a subject under investigation he may testify, and the weight given to his testimony is for the jury.").
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
medical products liability case, while individual experts can testify to a
lesser degree of certainty.33
Next, a court cannot assume that "reasonable medical certainty"
imposes a higher standard than "reasonable medical probability," al-
though that is the usual assumption.34 The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals' definition of "reasonable medical certainty" illustrates the
problem: "reasonable medical certainty[] reflects an objectively well-
founded conviction that the likelihood of one cause is greater than the
other; it does not mean the expert is 'personally certain' of the cause or
that the cause is discernible to a certainty."35 The Fifth Circuit has
equated "reasonable medical certainty" and "reasonable medical prob-
ability" by holding simultaneously that plaintiff must prove causation to
a reasonable medical certainty "but need only establish by a fair prepon-
derance of the evidence the reasonable medical probability" of
causation.36 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has interpreted Colorado law to
equate the two standards.37
Finally, not all jurisdictions that purport to use the same standard-
"reasonable medical certainty," for example-actually agree on what that
standard means or impose the .same evidentiary burden. For example, the
Sixth Circuit distinguished Tennessee from other jurisdictions that rely
on "reasonable medical certainty":
Whereas numerous jurisdictions have rejected medical experts' con-
clusions based upon a "probability," a "likelihood," and an opinion
that something is "more likely than not" as insufficient medical proof,
the Tennessee courts have adopted a far less stringent standard of
proof and have required only that the plaintiffs prove a causal con-
nection between their injuries and the defendant's tortious conduct by
a preponderance of the evidence. While, in accordance with Tennes-
see common law, plaintiff's proof by reasonable medical certainty re-
quires them only to establish that their particular injuries more likely
33. See, e.g., Jacques v. State, 487 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1984); McKellips v. Saint
Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 471 (Okla. 1987); Purina Mills, Inc. v. Odell, 948 S.W.2d 927,
937 (Tex. App. 1997); City of Richmond Police Dep't v. Bass, 493 S.E.2d 661, 667 (Va. Ct. App.
1997), rev'd on other grounds, 515 S.E.2d 557 (Va. 1999).
34. E.g., Forrestal v. Magendantz, 848 F.2d 303, 307 (1st Cir. 1988); Hovermale v. Berkeley
Springs Moose Lodge No. 1483, 271 S.E.2d 335, 340 (W. Va. 1980).
35. District of Columbia v. Watkins, 684 A.2d 395, 402-03 (D.C. 1996) (quoting Clifford v.
United States, 532 A.2d 628, 640 n.10 (D.C. 1987)).
36. Rewis v. United States, 503 F.2d 1202, 1218 (5th Cir. 1974).
37. See Zerr v. Trenkle, 454 F.2d 1103, 1106 (10th Cir. 1972). Accord Schrantz, 527 A.2d at
969 (accepting either reasonable medical certainty or reasonable medical probability); Dellenbach v.
Robinson, 642 N.E.2d 638, 648 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (noting that reasonable medical certainty and
reasonable medical probability are "essentially the same standard"); McKellips, 741 P.2d at 471
(accepting either "reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable medical probability" but stating that
"[a]bsolute certainty is not required, however, mere possibility or speculation is insufficient.").
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than not were caused by [the alleged cause], their proofs may be nei-
ther speculative nor conjectural."
Given these variations among the states, the determination of ex-
actly what kind of expert witness testimony the forum state requires can.
be critical to a plaintiff's success in his or her medical malpractice or
products liability action. However tempted federal courts sitting in diver-
sity might be to avoid this state-law quagmire and to simply apply Dau-
bert without regard to any state medical certainty standards, the Erie
doctrine generally requires them to apply the relevant state standard as
will be discussed. " This places a burden on the courts to first identify an
Erie conflict, then to apply both Daubert and the appropriate state stan-
dard in determining the admissibility of expert medical testimony.
III. THE ERIE DOCTRINE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. The Erie Doctrine in General
Because medical malpractice and products liability are generally
state-law claims, federal courts usually hear them through diversity juris-
diction.' As such, these claims are subject to the Erie doctrine, named
for the U.S. Supreme Court's 1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.' The Erie Court held that, "[e]xcept in matters governed by
the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in
any case is the law of the state," and that the law of the state included
both statutes and state common law.4' This holding has been interpreted
to mean that, in federal diversity cases, state law governs substantive
issues and federal law governs procedural issues.
Later Supreme Court decisions have refined this basic Erie rule,
particularly in terms of resolving the distinction between substantive
issues and procedural issues. In 1945, for example, the Court announced
an "outcome determinative" test for deciding whether state law is sub-
stantive enough to apply in diversity actions. 3 In Guaranty Trust Co. v.
38. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188. 1201 (6th Cir. 1988). See also Estate of
Patterson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 505 S.E.2d 232, 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) ("Thus,
'reasonable medical probability' has no greater meaning than a preponderance of the evidence, and
the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence as to medical causation.").
39. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g.,-Goldman v. Bosco, 120 F.3d 53, 54 (5th Cir. 1997); Hall v. Dow Coming Corp.,
114 F.3d 73, 78 (5th Cir. 1997); Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184,
189 (lst Cir. 1997).
41. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Federal courts have applied the Erie doctrine to diversity medical
malpractice or products liability cases. See, e.g., Cortes-Irizarry, Ill F.3d at 189; Free v. Carnesale,
110 F.3d 1227, 1230 (6th Cir. 1997); Boburka v. Adcock, 979 F.2d 424, 427 (6th Cir. 1993).
42. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In so holding, the Court overruled the
prior rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), which had held that state statutes but federal common
law governed in diversity cases. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18-19.
43. Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
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York, the Court faced the question of whether a federal court sitting in
diversity could, in effect, ignore a state statute of limitations. " The Court
announced that:
since a federal court adjudicating a state-created right solely because
of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in ef-
fect, only another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the
right to recover is made unavailable by the State nor can it substan-
tially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the State. 5
Thus, the question for a federal court to ask
is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and the means
by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced, or
whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect
that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly af-
fect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a
State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by
the same parties in a State court?('
In other words, the Erie doctrine ensures that "the outcome of the litiga-
tion in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal
rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a
State court."47 Thus, because the New York statute of limitations at issue
in Guaranty Trust would completely bar recovery, the federal court sit-
ting in diversity was bound to apply it in order to avoid a different out-
come under the federal law."
Thirteen years later, the Court modified the outcome determination
test to take account of important federal interests." In Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Electric Cooperative," the Court considered whether a diversity
plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial in federal district court to determine
his status as a statutory employee under South Carolina's worker's com-
pensation laws.' Under South Carolina law, such a finding would render
the defendant immune from straight tort liability. 2
The South Carolina courts had held that this issue of immunity was
a matter of law and as such was for the judge to decide." The Supreme
Court, in addressing this question, considered whether, under Erie, this
rule was part of state created "rights and obligations," which would thus
44. Id.
45. Id. at 108.
46. Id. at 109.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 110.
49. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
50. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 533-34.
51. Id. at 528.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 534 (citing Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 96 S.E.2d 566 (S.C. 1957)).
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require its application in federal court.' The Court determined that the
judge-decision rule was "not an integral part" of the rights and obliga-
tions created by the South Carolina Worker's Compensation Act."5 Fur-
ther, that the rule appeared "to be merely a form and mode of enforcing
the immunity." 6
While acknowledging that cases following Erie had held that federal
courts should apply state rules of form and mode where such rules might
have a substantial impact on the outcome of the litigation, the Byrd Court
added to the Erie analysis the consideration of the federal interest at
stake and thus backed away from the outcome determination test. 7 The
Byrd Court cited to "a strong federal policy against allowing state rules
to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts." 8 Stating that
"[an essential characteristic of [the federal system] is the manner in
which... it distributes trial functions between judge and jury and, under
the influence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment, assigns
the decisions of disputed questions of facts to the jury," the Court de-
cided that the state rule must yield to a federal jury trial. 9
The Supreme Court further modified the outcome determination test
in 1965 when it decided Hanna v. Plumer.6' Hanna involved a Massa-
chusetts statute that required delivery in hand or service upon the execu-
tor or administrator of an estate within one year of a decedent's death.'
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, in contrast, allowed service by leaving
a copy of the complaint at the defendant's dwelling house. When plain-
tiff filed her complaint in federal court, she followed Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4 in effecting service and left copies of the complaint
with the deceased defendant's wife, who was not the executor or admin-
istrator of the estate, at the decedent's residence 3 The defendant moved
54. Id. at 535 (referring to Erie's holding that "the federal courts must respect the definition of
state created rights and obligations by the state courts." ld. See also Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938)).
55. Id. at 536 (distinguishing the case at bar from Dice v. Akron, 342 U.S. 359 (1952), "where
this court held that the right to trial by jury is so substantial a part of the cause of action created by
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., that the Ohio courts could not apply, in
an action under that statute, the Ohio rule that the question of fraudulent release was for the
determination by a judge rather than by a jury." Id.).
56. Id.
57. See id. at 536-37.
58. Id. at 538.
59. Id. at 537. The Court additionally found that the likelihood of a different outcome was not
"so strong as to require the federal practice of jury determination of disputed factual issues to yield
to the state rule in the interest of uniformity of outcome." Id. at 540.
60. 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (footnote omitted).
61. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462 (referring to MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 197, § 9 (1958)).
62. See id. at 46. "Service shall be made as follows: . . . upon an individual other than an
infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him
personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing within." Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)).
63. See id.
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for summary judgment on the grounds that the Massachusetts statute was
controlling."' Despite the fact that the choice of rules was obviously out-
come determinative, the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4 controlled."
First, the Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 clearly
related to the "practice and procedure of the district courts" and thus did
not exceed the congressional mandate of the Rules Enabling Act.' All
rules promulgated pursuant to that Act, the Court held, are valid if they
"regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between
substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as ei-
ther." 7 Second, the Court refined what the outcome determination test
meant by holding that the test "cannot be read without reference to the
twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." 8 In this context, the
Court found the conflict between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and
the Massachusetts statute not truly outcome determinative because the
differing means of service did not present the kind of choice that would
encourage forum shopping at the time a plaintiff filed suit. 9 Finally, the
Court held that Erie was not intended as a means of invalidating the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and determined that when there is a direct
conflict between a valid Federal Rule and a state law, the Federal Rule
must control."
B. The Erie Doctrine and the Federal Rules of Evidence
Although the Supreme Court has applied the logic of Hanna v. Plu-
mer to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,7' it has never explicitly
64. See id. at 461-62.
65. See id. at 463-64.
66. Id. at 464. The Rules Enabling Act provides that: "The Supreme Court shall have the
power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of
appeals. Such rule shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1994). For an extensive discussion of the substantive rights limitation in the Rule Enabling Act, see
Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47 (1998). See also Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of
Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1797-1803 (1994)
(discussing "substance, procedure, and evidence law"); see generally Paul D. Carrington,
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281 (1989) (providing a
thorough discussion of the meaning of "substance" and "procedure" under the Rules Enabling Act
through illustrating both in the context of statutes of limitations).
67. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.
68. Id. at 468.
69. See id. at 468-69.
70. See id. at 469-74. For further refinements of the Hanna analysis and the Federal Rules, see
discussion infra Part IV.B.2.a.
71. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987).
In Hanna v. Plumer,... we set forth the appropriate test for resolving conflicts between
state law and the Federal Rules. The initial step is to determine whether, when fairly
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decided how the Erie doctrine and the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
Congress enacted in 1975, interact. Surprisingly, lower federal courts
demonstrate considerable differences of opinion on this issue.72 Because
the Federal Rules of Evidence, like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
derived originally from the Rules Enabling Act, 3 federal courts quite
simply could have extended the Hanna v. Plumer analysis and held that
the evidentiary rules are "rationally capable of classification" as proce-
dural." Thus, the Federal Rule of Evidence would trump if there is a con-
flict between a state and federal rule." While some federal circuit courts
construed, the scope of Federal Rule [of Appellate Procedure] 38 is "sufficiently broad"
to cause a "direct collision" with the state law or, implicitly, to "control the issue" before
the court, thereby leaving no room for the operation of that law .... The [Federal] Rule
must then be applied if it represents a valid exercise of Congress' rulemaking authority,
which originates in the Constitution, and has been bestowed on this Court by the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
Id.
72. Cf Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1306 (11 th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence, not state law, govern the admissibility of evidence in
federal court but that state law can be used in determining the materiality of evidence); United States
v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1125 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that when the Federal Rules of Evidence
and any state rule conflict, the Federal trump the state); Adams v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 820 F.2d 271,
273 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that "[wihere a state and federal evidentiary rule conflict, the proponent
is entitled "to the benefit of the more favorable rule."); Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d
344, 347 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that in diversity actions, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply; that
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that evidence is relevant if it is "of consequence" to the suit,
FED. R. EVID. 401; and that, thus, relevancy in a diversity action is determined by "the underlying
substantive state law.").
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1999).
74. Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897, 904 (3d Cir. 1988); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35
F.3d 717, 751 (3d Cit. 1994); Fasanaro v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 687 F. Supp. 482, 485 nn.4-5
(N.D. Cal. 1988).
75. A full discussion of whether and how the Erie doctrine applies to the Federal Rules of
Evidence is beyond the scope of this article. It is worth noting, however, that the issue is potentially
more complicated for the Federal Rules of Evidence than for either the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
First, Congress enacted the evidentiary rules as statutes, unlike the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, implying that the Supremacy Clause plays a role in the analysis as well as the Erie
doctrine. See Dudley, supra note 66, at 1798 (stating that "[b]ecause the Rules Enabling Act, with its
prohibition on modification of substantive rights, was the only available vehicle for federal evidence
reform, scholars debated intensely the question of whether evidence law as a whole could be
classified as 'procedural,' despite the various purposes served by the evidentiary rules," and arguing
that congressional enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence independent of the Rules Enabling
Act ended this argument that the rules were, by definition, procedural); Kenneth J. Lorge, Note,
Hottle v. Beech Aircraft: Confusion Surrounding the Choice of Law in Federal Diversity Actions
Persists as the Fourth Circuit Applies State Evidentiary Law in the Face of a Conflicting Rule of
Federal Evidence, 26 Sw. U. L. REV. 135, 147-49 (1996) (arguing that the Federal Rules of
Evidence apply in diversity cases through the Supremacy Clause as long as the law is arguably
procedural). Second, however, in adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress made it clear
that it intended to give effect to at least some aspects of the Erie doctrine. See Kelleher, supra note
66, at 82-83 ("Notably, [in the enacted Federal Rules of Evidence], the proposed Rules on privileges
were completely revised to require the application of state law whenever state law provides the
substantive rule of decision.").
In addition, three points argue against a simple extension of Hanna v. Plunzer to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. First, as will be argued infra in Part IV.B.2.a, later Erie jurisprudence
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have indeed followed this logic,76 most that have addressed the
Erie/Federal Rule of Evidence issue are in a least basic agreement that
some state evidentiary rules are so substantive that federal courts sitting
in diversity must take account of them.
77
The Federal Rules of Evidence "apply generally to civil actions and
proceedings. 78 Most federal courts apply the Federal Rules of Evidence
rather than state rules to all evidentiary questions in diversity cases. 79 The
Rules themselves eliminate many potential conflicts between state and
federal evidentiary rules-and hence eliminate many Erie issues-by ex-
pressly providing that when state law provides the rule of decision, state
law also applies in determining presumptions, privileges," and the com-
petency of witnesses.82
State law also can affect the admissibility of evidence in diversity
cases in two other ways. First, when state law supplies the rule of deci-
sion, it sets out the boundaries of what evidence is relevant. The Federal
emphasizes harmonizing state and federal provisions rather than choosing between them. Second,
the argument can be made-indeed, has troubled numerous federal courts-that evidentiary rules are
far more likely than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to affect substantive rights, thus
distinguishing the Hanna v. Plumer analysis for the Federal Rules of Evidence. Many scholars note
that Hanna's "rationally capable of classification as procedural rule" is subject to excessively broad
interpretations that go too far in allowing Federal Rules to displace state law. Professor Dudley
points out: "The interference with the independent administration of the federal system - that is, the
impact on the accuracy of fact-finding - occasioned by the application of a [state-law evidentiary]
rule in a diversity case arguably is not sufficient to justify disregarding a substantive state policy in
applying state law." Dudley, supra note 66, at 1797-1803; Carrington, supra note 66, at 297-99. See
also Kelleher, supra note 66, at 78-79 (arguing that the federal interest in determining what
evidence should be available is less compelling in diversity actions). Third, at least half of the
federal circuits addressing Erie/Federal Rules of Evidence problems have determined that the Erie
doctrine applies in their analysis of whether they should take account of state evidentiary rules.
76. See, e.g., Piamba Cortes, 177 F.3d at 1306 ("The admissibility of evidence in a federal
[diversity] action is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, not state law."); United States v.
Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1125 (lth Cir. 1999) ("[Sltate rules on any subject, cannot trump the
Federal Rules of Evidence."); Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1163 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (holding that under the Erie doctrine the admissibility of expert medical testimony in a
Bendectin case was a procedural issue). See also Daniel C. Hohler, First Circuit Application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in Diversity Jurisdiction: A Return to Hanna Analysis, 1 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOC. 49, 52-54, 61-64 (1995) (distinguishing the Erie and Hanna analyses
and implicitly approving the Hanna analysis for the Federal Rules of Evidence).
77. See Conway v. Chemical-Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1976);
Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1978); see also Carter, 716 F.2d
344, 347 (using Texas products liability law to determine relevance of evidence); Adams, 820 F.2d
271, 273 (using Missouri products liability law to determine relevance of evidence).
78. FED. R. EVID. 1101(b).
79. See e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 1995); Hottle v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1995); Espeaignnette v. Gene Tierney Co., 43 F.3d
1, 9 (1st Cir. 1994); Washington v. Department of Transp., 8 F.3d 296, 300 (5th Cir. 1993);
Grossheim v. Freightliner Corp., 974 F.2d 745, 754 (6th Cir. 1992); Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d
1320, 1324 (8th Cir. 1989); Romine v. Parman, 831 F.2d 944, 944-45 (10th Cir. 1987).
80. See FED. R. EvID. 302.
81. SeeFED.R.EvID.501.
82. See FED. R. EVID. 601.
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Rules create a general premise that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissi-
ble" and that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible." 3 Evi-
dence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence."'  Because in
diversity cases the underlying state-law claim or defense establishes
which facts are "of consequence to the determination of the action," 5
state law necessarily influences the court's application of the Federal
Rules.86
Second, when a state evidentiary rule embodies, reflects, or gives
effect to a state substantive policy, many federal courts will apply that
state rule pursuant to Erie. For example, in a case decided not long after
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Fourth Circuit dis-
cussed the potential Erie problems of dual-natured--evidentiary and
substantive-state rules that conflict with the Federal Rules of
Evidence." In that 1978 diversity case, an injured automobile driver
sought to admit evidence that the manufacturer of his car had violated a
federal safety standard." The Fourth Circuit performed an Erie analysis
to determine whether the state or Federal Rules governed the admissibil-
ity of the evidence. 9 In the end, it applied the Federal Rules, but only
because South Carolina substantive law was silent on the issue:
[I]n the absence of any indication of any policy in South Carolina, we
should be guided by the literal terms of the [Federal R]ules and admit
relevant evidence unless there is some reason not to do it. We do not
83. FED. R. EVID. 402.
84. FED. R. EVID. 401.
85. Id.
86. Thus, the Fifth Circuit, after determining that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in
diversity actions, nevertheless concluded that "[tlo determine relevancy in a diversity case we must
look to the underlying state substantive law." Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 347
(5th Cir. 1983). It looked to Texas law to determine whether evidence of industry custom was
relevant-and hence admissible-in a strict products liability case. Id. at 347-48. Similarly, the
Eighth Circuit, after determining that the Federal Rules of Evidence "provide the standards of
relevancy of evidence," nevertheless turned to Missouri products liability law to determine whether
state-of-the-art feasibility evidence should be admissible. Adams v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 820 F.2d
271,273 (8th Cir. 1987). But see Espeaignnette v. Gene Tierney Co., 43 F.3d 1,9-10 (lst Cir. 1994)
(determining the relevance of prior accidents in a strict products liability action with reference only
to federal decisions, holding that "it is axiomatic that in determining whether evidence is relevant,
and therefore admissible in a diversity action, the Federal Rules of Evidence supply the appropriate
rules of decision"); Romaine v. Parman, 831 F.2d 944, 945-46 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that "the
Federal Rules of Evidence should be applied in a diversity case in federal court to determine whether
evidence is relevant or prejudicial" and declining to follow state-law decisions that made pleas of
guilty in traffic offenses inadmissible).
87. See Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1978).
88. Stonehocker, 587 F.2d at 153 (citing Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1969)).
89. See id. at 154-55 (noting that South Carolina law governed the existence of the
manufacturer's duty "and the Supreme Court of that State ha[d] imposed a duty on automobile
manufacturers to use due care in car design.").
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imply that South Carolina can make no different rule; that is simply a
question not before us for she has not done so.9°
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits both hold "that there are State eviden-
tiary rules so bound up with the substantive law of the State that a federal
court sitting in that State should accord it the same treatment as the State
courts in order to give effect to the State's substantive policy."'" In 1995,
the Fourth Circuit applied Virginia state law in a diversity products li-
ability action where Virginia law provided that a party's private rules
were not admissible to prove negligence or to set a standard for that
party's duty of care. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit determined that a fed-
eral district court had to follow Texas law in a wrongful death diversity
action when Texas state law made evidence of a widow's remarriage
admissible and the non-admission of such evidence reversible error."
The Ninth Circuit has also held that under Erie some state eviden-
tiary rules should apply in diversity cases.94 In Wray v. Gregory, the court
stated that "even though the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975 rendered the Erie analysis inapplicable to most evidentiary ques-
tions in diversity cases, it did not have the effect of supplanting all state
90. Id. at 155-56.
91. Stonehocker, 587 F.2d at 155 (citing Conway v. Chemical-Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 540
F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1976)). But cf., Michael H. Gottesman, Should Federal Evidence Rules Trump
State Tort Policy? The Federalism Values Daubert Ignored, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1838 (1994)
(arguing that evidence that would be admitted in many state courts will not be admitted in federal
court under Daubert: "So long as diversity of citizenship exists, the defendant will remove the
[products liability] case to federal court, if not originally filed there by plaintiff, in order to achieve
the radically different outcome resulting from the federal courts' more stringent evidence rules.").
92. See Hottle v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.3d 106, 109-10 (4th Cir. 1995). Noting that
Virginia had made the policy of keeping private rules separate from the legal standard of reasonable
care as far back as 1915 and that "there is no countervailing federal interest compelling application
of the federal rules in this case," the Fourth Circuit concluded that "the Virginia rule is sufficiently
bound up with state policy so as to require its application in federal court." Id. at 110.
93. See Conway, 540 F.2d at 838-39. The court reasoned:
[W]e recognize in article 4675a [the Texas wrongful death statute at issue] one of those
rare evidentiary rules which is so bound up with state substantive law that federal courts
sitting in Texas should accord it the same treatment as state courts in order to give full
effect to Texas' substantive policy. Actions for wrongful death did not exist at common
law, and in Texas, as elsewhere, they are entirely the creation of statute .... [The
statutory provisions] remained constant for almost fifty years, until 1973, when the Texas
Legislature, doubtless to forestall further use of the tactics employed here to create a
misleading impression of continuing widowhood, enacted article 4675a and no other
amendment to the act at that session. Such a course of action evidences clearly that the
legislators considered the amendment a matter of significance and one necessary to
substantive policy in an area peculiarly within their control. As such, article 4675a
represents more than a mere rule of evidence; it is a declaration of policy by the creators
of the Texas wrongful death action that the sort of palming off theretofore practiced
would no longer be tolerated.
In such and similar circumstances, federal courts have long recognized an exception
to the inapplicability of Erie to evidentiary questions ....
Id. (citations omitted).
94. See Wray v. Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414, 1417-19 (1995) (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 77:1
WHEN DA UBERT GETS ERIE
law evidentiary provisions with federal ones."95 The court supported this
assertion by stating that "some state rules of evidence in fact serve sub-
stantive state policies and are more properly rules of substantive law
within the meaning of Erie."6
The First, Third, Seventh, and Eight Circuits similarly recognize the
substantive nature of some state evidentiary rules and have attempted to
define a substance/procedure distinction. In 1992, Judge Posner, writing
for the Seventh Circuit, formulated a test for determining when state evi-
dentiary rules are in fact substantive." In a diversity action against a car
manufacturer for personal injuries in an automobile accident, plaintiff
sought to exclude evidence that she had not been wearing a seatbelt
North Carolina law provided that evidence of not wearing a seatbelt was
generally inadmissible. 9 The Seventh Circuit reasoned:
Even in diversity cases the rules of evidence applied in federal
courts are the federal rules of evidence rather than state rules, save
with respect to matters of presumptions, privilege, and competency of
witnesses, Fed. R. Evid. 302, 501, 601, none of which is involved
here. If North Carolina's rule against the admission of testimony
about a failure to wear one's seatbelt is a rule of evidence, it is inap-
plicable to this case; and there is no counterpart rule in the federal law
of evidence.
Well, but is it a rule of evidence for purposes of the Erie doc-
trine, or is it a substantive rule and therefore binding in a diversity
case (or any other case in which state law supplies the rule of deci-
sion)? The difference is this. A pure rule of evidence, like a pure rule
of procedure, is concerned solely with accuracy and economy in liti-
gation and should therefore be tailored to the capacities and circum-
stances of the particular judicial system, here the federal one; while a
substantive rule is concerned with the channeling of behavior outside
the courtroom, and where as in this case the behavior in question is
regulated by state law rather than by federal law, state law should
govern even if the case happens to be in federal court.'50
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the North Carolina rule was
"founded on the desire of the North Carolina courts not to penalize the
failure to fasten one's seatbelt, because nonuse is so rampant in the state
that the average person could not be thought careless for failing to fasten
his seatbelt."' The state rule thus regulated behavior outside the court
95. Wray, 61 F.3d at 1417.
96. Id. at 1417 (quoting 19 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4512, at 194-95 (1984)).
97. Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada, 965 F.2d 195, 199 (7th Cir. 1992).
98. See Barron, 965 F.2d at 196-97, 198.
99. See id. at 198-99.
100. Id. (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 200. See also Milam v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 166, 170 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in diversity cases, "[b]ut where a state in
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and did not serve "solely [the] accuracy and economy" of the proceeding.
As a result, the rule was substantive law and, under Erie and Hanna, was
applicable in the determination of whether the evidence was
admissible.' °5
Both the Third and Fifth Circuits followed similar reasoning in
finding that the admissibility of evidence of seatbelt and child safety seat
use were substantive issues. The Third Circuit reasoned that the admissi-
bility of evidence of seatbelt use is a substantive question because the
evidence is, in itself, a defense having legal consequence and not merely
proof of some other fact.' °3 The Fifth Circuit similarly held that the ad-
missibility of evidence of non-use of a child safety seat was a substantive
issue." Determining that the Arkansas Child Passenger Protection Act' 5
regulated behavior by placing a legal duty on certain persons to use a
child safety seat, the court found the issue of admissibility to be "a clas-
sic example of the type of substantive rule of law binding upon a federal
court in a diversity case.""
The First Circuit has adopted a slightly different analysis. In 1985,
the First Circuit in Mclnnis v. A.M.F. acknowledged that while Congress
was free to enact rules that, under Hanna, could rationally be character-
ized as procedural, "federal courts and Congress are constitutionally pre-
cluded from displacing state substantive law with federal substantive
rules in diversity actions."'0 7 Thus, the court stated in dicta that "Congress
did not intend the [Federal R]ules to preempt so-called 'substantive' state
rules of evidence such as the parole evidence rule, the collateral source
rule, or the Statue of Frauds."'0 8
In 1999, however, the First Circuit "disavow[ed] the Mclnnis dic-
tum ''" in a case considering whether, in diversity actions, state evidence
rules "regarding compensation from collateral sources should displace
the Federal Rules of Evidence.""' The court first held that state law col-
lateral source rules must apply in diversity actions because such rules are
furtherance of its substantive policy makes it more difficult to prove a particular type of state-law
claim, the rule by which it does this, even if denominated a rule of evidence or cast in evidentiary
terms, will be given effect in a diversity suit as an expression of state substantive policy."). But see
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[Tlhe federal rules of
procedure and evidence always apply in federal litigation, whether or not they determine the
outcome.").
102. Barron, 965 F.2d at 200.
103. See Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 952 F.2d 430, 434-45 (3d Cir. 1992) (considering
whether evidence of seat belt non-use was correctly admitted at trial in a strict products liability
action).
104. See Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320, 1324 (8th Cir. 1994).
105.. See ARK. CODE § 27-34-101 et seq. (1999).
106. Potts, 882 F.2d at 1324.
107. Mcnnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 244 (1st Cir. 1985).
108. Mclnnis, 765 F.2d at 245.
109. Fitzgerald v. Expressway Sewerage Constr., Inc., 177 F.3d 71, 74 (1 st Cir. 1999).
110. Id. at 73-74.
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substantive.' The court then stated that the Federal Rules of Evidence
apply whenever a "rule is sufficiently broad to control a particular
issue.""' 2 Thus, the court determined that "here, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence (and in particular Rules 401, 402, and 403) are malleable enough
to deal with the principal evidentiary issues contemplated by the collat-
eral source rule: relevancy and unfairly prejudicial effect.""' 3 The effect
of this holding was that the Massachusetts collateral source rule barring
use of third party compensation was applicable in the determination of
damages, but the Federal Rules of Evidence allowed any other use of
collateral source evidence, provided the evidence satisfied the relevancy
requirements of the Rules."4
Thus, under the Erie and Hanna analyses, most circuits have
held that state evidentiary rules that have a substantive impact on the
decision will trump the Federal Rules of Evidence."' The tests or rea-
soning applied varies from circuit to circuit, but the general concept
holds that when a rule of evidence is significantly tied to a state substan-
tive policy, that policy will override the Federal Rules and determine the
evidentiary issue before the court.
C. Erie and State Medical Certainty Standards: Three Analyses
Because states use medical certainty standards for three different
evidentiary purposes,' 6 these standards require three different analyses
regarding the interactions of state law, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and the Erie doctrine.
1. Medical Certainty as a Burden of Proof
The Supreme Court has determined that burdens of proof are mat-
ters of state substantive law that must apply in diversity cases under the
Erie doctrine."' Therefore, in medical malpractice or medical strict prod-
Ill. See id. at 74 ("Whether tort damages in a tort suit are mitigable by payments originating
with a third party depends, quite obviously, on substantive principles. Hence, the state-law collateral
source rule supplies the rule of decision.").
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 74-76.
115. See, e.g., Wray v. Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414, 1417 (9th Cir. 1995); Dillinger v. Caterpiller,
Inc., 959 F.2d 430, 435-37 (3d Cir. 1992); Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada, 965 F.2d 195, 198-
99 (7th Cir. 1992); Adams v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 820 F.2d.271, 273 (8th Cir. 1986); Carter v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1983); Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp.,
587 F.2d 151, 154-56 (4th Cir. 1978); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 465-
66 (2d Cir. 1962).
116. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
117. See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959) (holding that state law
presumptions and burdens of proof are substantive for purposes of the Erie doctrine). Several
circuits have expressly held or noted that state law dictates the burden of proof in diversity actions.
See Gust v. Jones, 162 F.3d 587, 593 (10th Cir. 1998); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., Ill F.3d 782, 792
(10th Cir. 1997); Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Merit Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 248, 253 n.2 (7th Cir.
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ucts liability cases in federal court where a state uses a medical certainty
standard to define the plaintiff's burden of proof, those state standards
govern what the plaintiff must prove."8 For example, the Sixth Circuit
applied Tennessee's medical probability standard in a diversity medical
malpractice case, finding the defendant had not met the medical prob-
ability requirement in trying to assert a comparative fault defense against
a nonparty to the suit."9 Similarly, in a diversity products liability case,
the Eleventh Circuit imposed Florida's requirement that "plaintiffs
[must] prove by a preponderance of the evidence, with 'reasonable medi-
cal probability,"' that a manufacturer's alleged negligence caused the
patient's injury."2
While a plaintiff s overall burden of proof is governed by state law,
the circuits disagree as to whether other issues regarding the sufficiency
of evidence are also under the purview of state regulation.'2 ' For example,
the Fourth Circuit has held that the federal, not the state, medical cer-
tainty standard determines whether evidence offered to prove causation
in a medical products liability case is sufficient to create a jury
question.'22 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit has held that state law governs
1996); Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1446 (3d Cir. 1996); American Eagle
Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 85 F.3d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1996); American Title Ins. Co. v. East W. Fin.
Corp., 959 F.2d 345, 348 (ist Cir. 1992); Wynfield Inns v. Edward Leroux Group, Inc., 896 F.2d
483, 491 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
118. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 n.22 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding that New Jersey's standard "that a plaintiff show to a reasonable degree of medical
probability that defendant's conduct caused her injuries" was a burden of proof that governed in
federal diversity cases).
119. See Free v. Carnesale, 110 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kilpatrick v. Bryant,
868 S.W.2d 594, 602 (Tenn. 1993)).
120. Christopherv. Cutter Lab., 53 F.3d 1184, 1191 (llthCir. 1995).
121. For additional discussion of this conflict and an argument that state law should govern, see
Gottesman, supra note 95, at 1863-69.
122. See Owens v. Bourns, Inc., 766 F.2d 145, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Even under diversity
jurisdiction the sufficiency of the evidence to create a jury question is a matter governed by federal
law."). Accord, Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1221, 1259 n.47
(10th Cir. 1999) ("While state law governs a party's substantive entitlement to damages in a
diversity case like this, it is well-established that federal law governs the grant or denial of a new-
trial motion in diversity cases, and, at least in this Circuit, governs the determination whether
evidence is sufficient to support a verdict."); Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group,
Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1308 n.44 (1 th Cir. 1998) ("The sufficiency of the evidence to create a case for
the jury is a procedural issue to which we apply federal law.") (citing Excel Handbag Co. v. Edison
Bros. Stores, Inc., 630 F.2d 379, 383-84 (5th Cir. 1980)); Taylor v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 130
F.3d 1395, 1399 (10th Cir. 1997) (in diversity cases, federal law controls the issue of whether the
evidence in a products liability action is sufficient to go to the jury); Mayer v. Gary Partners & Co.,
29 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1994) (in diversity cases, federal law controls the issue of whether the
evidence is sufficient to survive summary judgment); Pegasus Helicopters, Inc. v. United Tech.
Corp., 35 F.3d 507, 510 (10th Cir. 1994) (in diversity cases, federal law controls the sufficiency of
evidence for judgment as a matter of law); Thrash v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 992 F.2d 1354,
1356 (5th Cir. 1993) (federal law governs the sufficiency of evidence in upholding a jury verdict in
diversity cases); ABC-Paramount Records, Inc. v. Topps Record Distrib. Co., 374 F.2d 455, 460 (5th
Cir. 1967) ("[T]he sufficiency of the evidence to raise a question of fact for the jury is controlled by
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the sufficiency of evidence to survive a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict because it is a substantive rule under Erie." There-
fore, even if the state medical certainty standard defines a burden of
proof, the question of whether that standard governs a sufficiency issue
depends on the exact procedural posture of the case and the circuit in
which the case is being heard.
2. Medical Certainty as a Matter of Witness Competency
When state law characterizes the applicable medical certainty stan-
dard as determining a medical expert's competence to testify, the Federal
Rules of Evidence themselves provide that state law controls, eliminating
the need for a complex Erie analysis. Under Federal Rule of Evidence
601, "in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State
law."''" Thus, in state-law medical malpractice actions, federal courts
must apply state evidentiary rules to determine a medical expert's com-
petency to testify."n
3. Medical Certainty and Admissibility
The most complex Erie problem involving state medical certainty
standards arises when the state medical certainty standard governs the
admissibility of an expert's testimony. Here, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and state law seem to conflict. State laws generally hold that the
expert's testimony is admissible if the expert testifies to the relevant state
standard, while Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that: "If scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue a witness quali-
fied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.' 26
Two aspects of the state medical certainty standards support the
argument that state standards should be applied in diversity cases. First,
federal law."). But see Gust v. Jones, 162 F.3d 587, 593 (10th Cir. 1998) ("When reviewing diversity
actions, we examine the sufficiency of the evidence on a particular issue by reference to the burden
of proof dictated by forum state law.").
123. See Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). Accord Morales v. American Honda Motor Co., 151
F.3d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying the state-law standard of review to a Rule 50(b) motion for
judgment as a matter of law); Ashley v. R.D. Columbia Assocs. L.P., 54 F.3d 498, 501 (8th Cir.
1995) (in diversity cases, state law provides the standard for the sufficiency of evidence for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
124. FED. R. EvID. 601.
125. See e.g., LeMaire v. United States, 826 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir. 1987); Geeslin v.
Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., No. CIV. A. 1:97CV186-D, 1998 WL 527111, at *2-3 (N.D. Miss.
July 27, 1998) (applying state rules regarding witness competency pursuant to FED. R. EviD. 601).
126. See FED. R. EVD. 702.
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even when couched in terms of "admissibility," the requirement that a
medical expert be able to testify to a certainty standard is essentially a
competency requirement, as the Tenth Circuit has implicitly
recognized.'2 7 Under Colorado law, medical testimony "is admissible if
founded on reasonable medical probability."'28 The Tenth Circuit applied
state standard because, under 601, it was necessary to apply Colorado
law to determine "the competency of [the doctor's] testimony."'29 Indeed,
any line drawn between competency and admissibility in this situation
would necessarily be arbitrary: Is the medical expert an incompetent wit-
ness because his or her testimony is inadmissible for failure to meet the
requisite standard, or is that testimony inadmissible because the expert is
not competent under that standard to give an opinion? Therefore, in
many cases, the state standard will apply through Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 601 even if couched as an "admissibility" requirement.
Second, state medical certainty standards governing admissibility
often are substantive evidentiary rules, requiring their application in ap-
propriate diversity cases under Erie.'35 As noted, for Erie purposes, fed-
eral courts generally determine whether a state rule is substantive by
applying the "outcome determinative" test."' In the Supreme Court's
most recent formulation of this test, the question is: "Would application
of the [state] standard ... have so important an effect upon the fortunes
of one or both of the litigants that failure to apply it would unfairly dis-
criminate against citizens of the forum State, or be likely to cause a
plaintiff to choose the federal court?"'32 For many states imposing a
medical certainty standard on the admissibility of expert medical testi-
mony, the answer to this question is "yes," indicating that federal courts
should apply the state standard.'3
In many states, a medical certainty admissibility requirement serves
to ensure that an expert has a requisite degree of confidence in his or her
conclusion, particularly regarding medical causation. It leads state courts
to exclude expert medical testimony that identifies only medical "possi-
bilities" or that avoids identification of a particular cause."M Thus, state
127. LeMaire, 826 F.2d at 954.
128. Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Rules of Decision Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1999) ("The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decisions in civil actions in the United States, in cases where they apply.").
131. See supra notes 40-65 and accompanying text.
132. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996) (quoting Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,468 n.9 (1965)).
133. See Gottesman, supra note 91, at 1851-55 (discussing how state standards for expert
testimony differ substantively from that in Daubert).
134. For example, in Texas, "[a] possible cause only becomes 'probable' [for purposes of the
reasonable medical probability standard] when, in the absence of other reasonable causal
explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action." Williams v.
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medical certainty standards impose substantive obligations on expert
medical testimony.
Failure to meet the state standard can have an immediate substantive
effect on a particular case because exclusion of the expert's testimony
often leads to the failure of the plaintiff s prima facie case. For example,
the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld a lower court's grant of defendant's
motion for summary judgment when the plaintiffs sole medical expert
witness failed to testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that
the plaintiff's fallopian tube could have been saved had her HMO al-
lowed a transfer to another hospital.' "The only permissible inference
from the [expert's testimony] is that [plaintiff's] fallopian tube possibly
could have been saved had she remained at Bergan [Hospital] for sur-
gery. Medical testimony couched in terms of 'possibility' is insufficient
to support a causal relationship."'36
Under more traditional distinctions between "substance" and "pro-
cedure," law is substantive if it creates, defines, or regulates legal rights
or duties.' As noted, state medical certainty standards often implicitly
impose content requirements on expert medical testimony. In addition,
most states require a medical malpractice or medical products liability
plaintiff to produce expert testimony on the issue of causation, and re-
quire those experts to testify to the requisite state standard.'38 In other
words, states partially regulate the availability of these torts through their
medical certainty standards. In Pennsylvania, for example, to establish a
prima facie case of malpractice, a plaintiff must present an expert wit-
ness who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the
acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical stan-
dards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suf-
fered."'39 Pennsylvania medical malpractice plaintiffs cannot avoid the
state law medical certainty standard by submitting other kinds of evi-
dence. Thus, in Pennsylvania, for medical malpractice plaintiffs, the
submission of expert testimony that meets the requisite standard is a part
of their burden of proof-and burdens of proof, as discussed above, are
substantive law.
NGF, Inc., 994 S.W. 2d 255, 256-57 (Tex. App. 1999). Similarly, in Vermont, a psychiatric expert's
testimony met the "reasonable degree of medical certainty" standard when the expert positively
identified psychological rather than physical causes as the source of the plaintiffs pain after a fall.
Everett v. Town of Bristol, 674 A.2d 1275, 1277 (Vt. 1996).
135. See Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Neb. 1994).
136. Steineke, 518 N.W. 2d at 907-08.
137. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Bankers Trust Co., v.
Lee Keeling & Assocs., 20 F.3d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir. 1994).
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State medical certainty standards thus effectively embody a policy
choice by certain states to limit the kind of medical testimony that a
medical tort plaintiff can use to prove his or her case. As discussed,
many states have determined that medical experts who are not willing to
testify to the requisite degree of medical certainty will not be allowed to
confuse the issue of causation by testifying to something less than the
threshold state standard. In these states, therefore, medical tort plaintiffs
cannot rely on sophisticated speculation to prove causation by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. Medical certainty standards thus serve as a
screening device for expert medical testimony. Notably, medical mal-
practice screening requirements have universally been held to be sub-
stantive rules of law by thefederal circuits that have addressed them.'4
By analogy, state medical certainty standards, as screening devices, are
also substantive rules that federal courts should apply in diversity cases.
D. The Problem: Uncertain Application of State Medical Certainty
Standards
The substantive character of most states' medical certainty admissi-
bility standards and the federal circuits' general willingness to apply state
substantive evidentiary rules in diversity actions strongly suggest that
state medical certainty standards should apply in diversity medical tort
cases. However, only the Third Circuit has held that state medical cer-
tainty standards govern the admissibility of medical experts in diversity
actions. 4'
In In re Paoli, a 1994 products liability case, the Third Circuit first
noted that Pennsylvania law requires medical experts to testify to causa-
tion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 2 It then decided that
this requirement, if viewed purely as a rule of admissibility, would be "in
conflict with [Federal Rules of Evidence] 702 and 703 which require a
140. In an effort to weed out non-meritorious medical malpractice claims, keep medical costs
down for insurance purposes, and encourage alternative dispute resolution, several state have
enacted medical malpractice screening requirements. These statutes generally require potential
medical malpractice plaintiffs to take their grievance before a panel or committee, and that panel or
committee's evaluation of the potential case is usually admissible into evidence. The six federal
circuits that have faced the question of whether federal courts sitting in diversity must follow these
state-law screening statutes have all answered in the affirmative, concluding that the screening and
admissibility requirements are sufficiently substantive to require application under Erie. See Wray v.
Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1995); Daigle v. Maine Med. Ctr., 14 F.3d 684, 687-90
(1st Cir. 1994); DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem'l Hosp., 628 F.2d 287, 292 (4th Cir.
1980); Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 135, 141 (3d Cir. 1979); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 603
F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1979); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1979).
But see Braddock v. Orlando Reg'l Health Care Sys., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 580, 582-84 (M.D. Fla.
1995) (refusing, pursuant to the Erie doctrine, to apply Florida's statutory pre-suit requirements for
medical malpractice suits in a federal diversity action because state law directly conflicted with
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3, 4 and 8).
141. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 750-52 (3d Cir. 1994).
142. See In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 750.
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reliable methodology ...but nowhere require a reasonable degree of
medical certainty."'' 3 As such, if the state rule was merely a "standard of
admissibility in conflict with Federal Rules of Evidence Pennsylvania's
rule would be 'rationally capable of classification as procedural' and the
Federal Rules of Evidence would govern."" Pennsylvania's medical cer-
tainty standard, however, was found not just a standard of admissibility, but
also part of plaintiff's burden of proof, because the Pennsylvania courts had
"strongly implied that, even if admissible, testimony with less than a reason-
able degree of medical certainty was insufficient to prove causation."'' 5 There-
fore, "Pennsylvania's rule is a substantive one, not in conflict with Federal
Rules of Evidence, and thus governs in federal court.""
Most other federal circuits have been unwilling to consider whether
state laws have a substantive effect on the admissibility of expert testi-
mony. The First,' 7 Fourth,'48 Fifth,'49 and Eighth'" Circuits have each held
that Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and not state law, governs the admis-
sibility of expert medical testimony.'"' In addition, outside of the context
of medical experts, the Sixth,'52 Seventh,' 3 and Tenth" Circuits have
143. Id. at 751; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-91 (1993)
(discussing what Federal Rules of Evidence 702 & 703 require).
144. Id. (quoting Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897, 904-06 (3d Cir. 1988)).
145. Id. (interpreting Cohen v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 592 A.2d 720, 723 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991)).
146. Id. at 752. The Third Circuit has recently reaffirmed its approach, noting that in addition to
the Daubert analysis, "state rules on the degree of certainty required of an expert's opinion apply" in
diversity cases. Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999).
147. See Forrestal v. Magendantz, 848 F.2d 303, 305 (1st Cir. 1988) ("The exclusion or
admission of testimony is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence in diversity cases as well as in
all others.").
148. See Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052, 1054 (4th Cir. 1986)("Unlike
evidentiary rules concerning burdens of proof or presumptions, the admissibility of expert testimony
in a federal court sitting in the diversity jurisdiction is controlled by federal law. State law, whatever
it may be, is irrelevant.").
149. See Dawsey v. Olin Corp., 782 F.2d 1254, 1262 (5th Cir. 1986).
150. See Clark v. Heidrick, 150 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 1998). In a diversity medical
malpractice case regarding the explicit issue of whether a medical expert's testimony could be
admissible even though it did not meet the "reasonable medical certainty standard," the Eighth
Circuit held that "'[tihe question of whether expert testimony should be admitted or excluded is a
matter governed by federal, rather than state, law."' Id. (quoting Fox v. Dannenberg, 906 F.2d 1253,
1255 (8th Cir. 1990)).
151. See id.
152. See Brooks v. American Broad. Co., 999 F.2d 167, 173 (6th Cir. 1993) ("The admissibility
of expert testimony is a matter of federal, rather than state, proedure.").
153. See Stutzman v. CRST, Inc., 997 F.2d 291, 294-95 (7th Cir. 1993) (considering whether
expert testimony is substantive or procedural and finding that "the Federal Rules governing expert
testimony reflect a procedural judgment that juries are aided by hearing expert testimony and that
assistance enhances the accuracy of the entire process-even where an expert is not absolutely
certain about his conclusion."). See also United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1072-73 (7th Cir.
1977) (upholding Rule 702 as the sole measure of an expert's admissibility and refusing to impose a
medical certainty standard, and citing United States v. Wilson, 441 F.2d 655, 656 (2d Cir. 1971), for
"the rule that an expert's lack of absolute certainty goes to the weight of his testimony, not to its
admissibility."); Rogers v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F. Supp. 606, 611 n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (citing
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stated categorically that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the ad-
missibility of experts in diversity actions because the issue is a proce-
dural one. Thus, all but one of the circuits that have addressed the issue
have indicated that state medical certainty standards do not apply in a
diversity case to determine the admissibility of an expert's testimony.
IV. THE DA UBERT COMPLICATION: FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702
AND STATE MEDICAL CERTAINTY STANDARDS
A. Admissibility of Scientific Experts in Federal Court: The Daubert
Analysis
As has been discussed, medical malpractice and medical product
liability cases almost always involve the testimony of expert witnesses to
prove causation.' In federal courts, for almost 70 years, the guideline for
the admissibility of scientific and medical expert testimony was the Frye
test, which takes its name from the 1923 appellate court case of Frye v.
United States.'56 The question facing the Frye court was whether an ex-
pert witness's testimony as to the results of a systolic blood pressure de-
ception test, a type of lie detector test, was admissible against a criminal
defendant. 7 The court held that such testimony was inadmissible, creat-
ing a test of general acceptance for admissibility:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
Stutzman, 997 F.2d at 295, for the principle that "[allthough federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction apply state law to substantive issues, the admissibility of expert testimony in diversity
suits is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence"); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Massachusetts Bay Ins.
Co., No. 90 C 2005, 1997 WL 51653, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5 1997) (citing Daubert for the principle
that the "admissibility of [an expert's] testimony in federal court depends not on any state law but on
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1267,
1275 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that an Illinois rule rendering expert reconstruction testimony
inadmissible when eyewitness testimony was available did not apply in a diversity action because
state law rules of admissibility of expert testimony do not apply in federal court). But see Lovejoy
Elecs., Inc. v. O'Berto, 873 F.2d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that "as a general rule federal
rather than state law governs the admissibility of evidence in federal diversity cases" but recognizing
exceptions when the Rules themselves so provide and when "substantive rules masquerad[e] as
evidence rules").
154. See Gust v. Jones, 162 F.3d 587, 594 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The admission of expert testimony
in a federal trial is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 .... ).
155. See supra notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text; see also Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion
Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 191 (1st Cir. 1997); Rohrbough v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 916 F.2d 970,
972 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that proof of causation in a products liability case involving a vaccine
"must be by expert testimony.").
156. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
157. Seeid.at1013
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sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs.'58
In 1993, however, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Frye general
acceptance test in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' a
products liability case in which the child plaintiffs alleged that their
mothers' ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy caused their birth de-
fects." The Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence supersede the
Frye test.'6 ' Specifically Federal Rule of Evidence 702, '62 which governs
the admissibility of "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge," does not establish "'general acceptance' as an absolute prerequi-
site to admissibility," nor was there "any clear indication that [Federal
Rule of Evidence] 702 or the Rules as a whole were intended to incorpo-
rate a 'general acceptance' standard."' 3 Noting that "Frye made 'general
acceptance' the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony,"
the Court concluded that "[t]hat austere standard, absent from, and in-
compatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in
federal trials."'"
While rejecting the Frye test, the Court nevertheless acknowledged
that the Federal Rules place "limits on the admissibility of purportedly
scientific evidence.' '6 "[T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reli-
able.'"" According to the Court, this duty requires examination of two
issues: (1) Is the proffered evidence "scientific knowledge;" and (2) Will
the proffered evidence assist the trier of fact in understanding or deter-
mining a fact in issue?' 7
Scientific knowledge has "a grounding in the methods and proce-
dures of science" and is "more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation."'"M While the subject of scientific testimony need not be
"known to a certainty," "an inference or assertion must be derived by the
scientific method."'"M The scientific knowledge requirement, therefore,
158. Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
159. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
160. See id. at 582.
161. See id. at 586-87.
162. FED. R. EVID. 702. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." Id.
163. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
164. Id. at 589.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 592.
168. Id. at 589-90.
169. Id. at 590.
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"establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability."'" ° Assisting the trier of
fact, by contrast, "goes primarily to relevance'"'-a question of "fit."'"2
"'Fit' is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not
necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.""'
The Court delineated four factors for federal courts to consider
when screening scientific and technical evidence for admissibility: (1)
whether the theory or technique "can be (and has been) tested"; (2)
"whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication;" (3) "the known or potential rate of error" "and the existence
and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operations;"
and (4) "general acceptance.' 74 However, the Court also emphasized that
the inquiry into scientific evidence's admissibility is "a flexible one" and
that the focus "must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate."'75 Moreover, other Federal Rules of Evi-
dence-such as Rule 403, which allows a federal judge to exclude oth-
erwise admissible evidence "'if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury,"' also play a role in the final decision of whether to
admit scientific evidence.' 6
Federal district and appellate courts have varied in their applications
of the Daubert standards, particularly regarding evidence of causation
and the role of experts' conclusions in the evaluation process. For exam-
ple, on remand of the Daubert case, the Ninth Circuit excluded expert
witness testimony on both scientific knowledge and fitness grounds.'"
Some of the expert testimony on the issue of whether Bendectin can
cause birth defects was inadmissible because the plaintiffs failed to suffi-
ciently establish the reliability of that testimony:
[P]laintiffs rely entirely on the experts' unadorned assertions that the
methodology they employed comports with standard scientific proce-
dures. In support of these assertions, plaintiffs offer only the trial and
deposition testimony of these experts in other cases. While these ma-
terials indicate that plaintiffs' experts have relied on animal studies,
chemical structure analyses and epidemiological data, they neither
explain the methodology the experts followed to reach their conclu-
sions nor point to any external source to validate that methodology.





174. See id. at 593-94.
175. Id. at 594-95.
176. Id. at 595 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403).
177. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharn., Inc. (Daubert 11), 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995).
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clusions and their assurances of reliability. Under Daubert, that's not
enough.1 8
The court found other expert testimony inadmissible because it
amounted merely to opinion. The only expert willing to testify that Ben-
dectin caused the children's limb defects "asserte[d] only that Bendectin
is a teratogen and that he [had] examined the plaintiffs' medical records,
which apparently reveal the timing of their mothers' ingestion of the
drug."' 79 The expert offered "no tested or testable theory to explain, how,
from this limited information, he was able to eliminate all other potential
causes of birth defects, nor does he explain how he alone can state as a
fact that Bendectin caused plaintiffs' injuries.""'8 In the court's opinion,
these assertions amounted to personal opinion, not science, and thus were
inadmissible under Daubert.'"'
In addition, the Ninth Circuit found plaintiffs' proffered expert tes-
timony on causation to be insufficient in terms of "fit."'' 2 Noting that
California tort law supplied the governing substantive tort standard,'83 the
court defined "fit" under the circumstances:
California tort law requires plaintiffs to show not merely that Ben-
dectin increased the likelihood of injury, but that it more likely than
not caused their injuries. In terms of statistical proof, this means that
plaintiffs must establish not just that their mothers' ingestion of Ben-
dectin increased somewhat the likelihood of birth defects, but that it
more than doubled it--only then can it be said that Bendectin is more
likely than not the source of their injury. '
Because "[n]one of plaintiffs' epidemiological experts claims that inges-
tion of Bendectin during pregnancy more than doubles the risk of birth
defects," their testimony was inadmissible.'85 The Ninth Circuit thus took
a relatively aggressive stand regarding the court's gatekeeping role and
incorporated the state-law burden of proof into its Daubert analysis.
In contrast, addressing the issue of whether Depo-Provera can cause
birth defects, the D.C. Circuit more conservatively emphasized that "the
Daubert analysis does not establish a heightened threshold for the admis-
sion of expert evidence, but rather focuses on the court's 'gatekeeper'
role as a check on 'subjective belief and 'unsupported speculation.'"'"
Indeed, according to the D.C. Circuit, "the threshold for admissibility has





183. See id. at 1320.
184. Id. at 1320-21 (citations omitted).
185. Id.
186. Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 591).
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been lowered, both because of the liberal theory of admissibility adopted
by the Federal Rules of Evidence and because Frye's 'general accep-
tance' test is no longer dispositive of admissibility."'
87
The D.C. Circuit expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit's fitness
evaluation for epidemiological evidence, holding that "[t]he dispositive
question is whether the testimony will 'assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,' . . . not whether the
testimony satisfies the plaintiff's burden on the ultimate issue at trial.'' 188
It admitted expert testimony that Depo-Provera "is capable of causing the
types of defects" that the infant plaintiff suffered even though that testi-
mony failed "to establish the causal link to a specified degree of prob-
ability," because the testimony nevertheless "could aid the jury's resolu-
tion of the [plaintiffs'] claims."'' 9 As such, the D.C. Circuit eliminated
consideration of state-law burdens of proof from the Daubert analysis.'"
Thus, for the moment, how the Daubert analysis and state law inter-
act for diversity medical malpractice cases is subject to circuit variations.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent opinions clarifying Daubert have
done little to resolve the issue. In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,9' an
electrician of the City of Thomasville, Georgia, sued three chemical
manufacturers under a strict products liability theory, alleging that poly-
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in electrical transformers and voltage
regulators caused his lung cancer.' 2 Before the Supreme Court, the issue
was a narrow one: "what standard an appellate court should apply in re-
viewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony un-
der Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.."'9 The Court deter-
mined that "abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard."'9"
The Court emphasized that a court of appeals reviewing a district
court's decision "may not categorically distinguish between rulings al-
lowing expert testimony and rulings which disallow it."'95 Further, district
courts performing Daubert evaluations may not draw bright lines be-
tween methodology and conclusions.' Noting that "conclusions and
methodology are not entirely distinct from one another," the court held
that it is within a District Court's discretion to conclude that an expert's
187. Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 134.
188. Id. at 135 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (quoting FED. R. EvmD. 702)).
189. Id. at 135-36.
190. See id. at 135 n.8 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's approach and noting that "[i]n light of our
disposition, we have no occasion to consider whether the substantive tort law of California and the
District of Columbia are similar . .
191. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
192. See Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 528-29 (11 th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 520
U.S. 1114 (1997), rev'd, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
193. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 138.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 142.
196. See id.
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methodology is insufficient to support his or her proferred opinion.97
Thus, although the Joiner opinion gives lower courts no guidance on the
issue of what to do with state-law sufficiency standards in general or
with medical certainty requirements in particular, the Court indirectly
validated more broadly-focused Daubert inquiries such as that the Ninth
Circuit undertook in Daubert H. After Joiner, therefore, defendants remain
free to argue that when an expert's conclusion regarding causation is inadmis-
sible or insufficient under the applicable state-law standard, it may simply not
"fit" the case at hand under Daubert's analytical framework.
More recently, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,'98 the Supreme
Court expanded Daubert's applicability to not only "scientific" but also
"technical" expert testimony.'" The Court again emphasized that the
Daubert screening is "flexible" and specifically held that the Daubert
factors "do not constitute a 'definitive checklist or test. '''"°° Instead, the
Daubert inquiry ensures "that an expert, whether basing testimony upon
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom
the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an
expert in the relevant field.""2 ' The Kumho Court, however, made no
mention of the Erie doctrine or of state substantive law.202
B. When Daubert Gets Erie: Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and State-
Law Medical Certainty
1. Daubert and State-Law Medical Certainty Standards
Because, in federal court, expert medical testimony must be based
on "scientific knowledge,"2 3 medical experts and their opinions on medi-
cal causation are subject to screening under Daubert.2 " Like the Erie
197. See id. at 146.
198. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
199. Kumho, 119 S. Ct. at 1174.
200. Id. at 1175 (emphasis added) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593).
201. Id. at 1176.
202. See generally id. at 1167-80.
203. FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 588 (19993).
204. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999) (discussed supra, Part IV.A), eliminated many of the potentially hairsplitting decisions that
federal courts had been making regarding when the Daubert analysis applies. See, e.g., Desrosiers v.
Flight Int'l, Inc., 156 F.3d 952, 960-61 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the Daubert analysis may not
apply to testimony of accident reconstruction experts that did not involve scientific knowledge);
Talkington v. Atria Reclamelucifers Fabrieken BV (Cricket BV), 152 F.3d 254, 265 (4th Cir. 1998)
(holding that Daubert does not apply to an electrical engineer's expert testimony based on his
experience and training in the absence of a challenge to his methodology or technique); Michigan
Millers Mut. Ins. Corp. v. Benfield, 140 F.3d 915, 920 (11 th Cir. 1998) (noting that Daubert applies
to expert testimony based on science, not experience, but holding that expert testimony regarding the
origin of a fire was subject to Daubert because it relied on scientific method); Carmichael v.
Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (holding that Daubert applies only to
expert witnesses who claim scientific expertise and thus did not apply to the testimony of an expert
regarding tire failure); United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
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doctrine, however, the Daubert analysis interacts with state medical cer-
tainty standards in potentially three ways, depending on how a particular
state uses its standard.
a. Medical Certainty as the Burden of Proof: The Effect on
When Daubert Determinations Are Made
As discussed above, when state medical certainty standards define
the burden of proof, there is no question that they will apply in appropri-
ate diversity actions. The issue regarding Daubert, therefore, is when
they apply: should the court consider burdens of proof as part of Dau-
bert's fitness prong, or are those burdens more appropriately considered
after the Daubert rulings are made?
As the Ninth and the D.C. Circuits have demonstrated, the relation-
ship between Daubert admissibility and the state-law burdens of proof in
diversity medical malpractice and products liability cases is not clear. In
Daubert II, the Ninth Circuit's application of a state-law burden of proof
in the "fitness" prong of the Daubert analysis became critical to the
plaintiffs' Bendectin case, resulting in the exclusion of plaintiffs' ex-
Daubert applies to polygraph evidence because it is scientific); Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 126
F.3d 679, 687 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 989-91 (5th Cir.
1997) for the principle that Daubert is not limited to "scientific knowledge" or "novel" scientific
evidence and holding that it applied to expert clinical medical testimony); Watkins, 121 F.3d at 989-
91 (holding that expert testimony in a products liability case regarding defective design was subject
to Daubert); McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Daubert applies only to "scientific knowledge" and thus did not apply to a products liability product
design expert's testimony because that testimony was based on "technical or other specialized
knowledge"); Freeman v. Case Corp., 118 F.3d 1011, 1016 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that Daubert
does not apply when an expert relies on experience and training rather than a particular
methodology); Masayesva v. Hale, 118 F.3d 1371, 1379 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Daubert does
not apply to an expert's relatively straightforward application of range economics); United States v.
Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Daubert was not applicable to a police
expert's testimony regarding the reasons people hide guns because the testimony was not based on
scientific knowledge); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 111 F.3d 528,
534 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that Daubert applies to the testimony of "social scientists as well as to
that of natural scientists"); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that Daubert applies to all expert testimony but that survey evidence should generally
be found admissible); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Daubert applies only to the admission of scientific testimony); Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82
F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that Daubert applies only when an expert relies on a
principle or methodology); lacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that Daubert applies only to scientific testimony).
Even before Kumho Tire, however, only two federal courts declined to apply Daubert to
expert medical testimony. Sementilli v. Trinidad Corp., 155 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the Daubert analysis does not apply to a doctor's testimony regarding a seaman's
fitness for duty because it "does not constitute 'scientific' testimony but rather testimony based on
the doctor's training and experience"); Waitek v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 934 F. Supp. 1068,
1087 n.10 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (holding that the Daubert factors do not apply to clinical medical
testimony based solely on experience or training). It appears that after Kumho Tire, Daubert should
always apply to expert medical testimony.
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perts.05 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit reversed a district court's decision to
exclude causation experts because the district court impermissibly failed
"to distinguish between the threshold question of admissibility and the
persuasive weight to be assigned the expert evidence."'  State-law bur-
dens of proof were simply not relevant."
The Ninth and D.C. Circuits' differences in approach reflect a
philosophical division among the circuits regarding the desirability of
early and active judicial management of cases involving complex causa-
tion issues, particularly class action products liability suits. As discussed,
Daubert sets forth a threshold standard of admissibility, based on meth-
odology and reliability. Given the Federal Rules' emphases on
conferencing and early case management, 8 Daubert screenings often
take place before-sometimes long before-trial itself begins.2' For ex-
ample, when a patient, on behalf of her minor son, brought a medical mal-
practice action against her obstetrician alleging that the obstetrician had
negligently post-dated her pregnancy and thus caused her son's brain dam-
age, the First Circuit held that plaintiffs expert could be held to the Dau-
bert standard of admissibility even at the summary judgment stage." '
Moreover, when Daubert rulings either recognize or create-
through exclusion of critical testimony-a gap in a plaintiff s prima facie
case, they can, as a practical matter, end the litigation and take a case
away from a jury."' In fact, since the Supreme Court decided Daubert in
1993, the circuits have demonstrated that its application clearly affects
when and how federal cases involving experts are resolved. Affirmation
or reversal of summary judgment in Daubert cases now often depends on
whether the appellate court agrees or disagrees with the trial court's
screening of a particular expert."2 Affirmances and reversals of judgment
205. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
206. Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
207. See id. at 135 n.8.
208. See FED. R. Evil. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person
to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court ... "); FED. R. CIr. P. 16(a), (c)(4) (authorizing the court to hold pretrial conferences in
order, among other things, to discuss "the avoidance of unnecessary proof and of cumulative
evidence, and limitations or restrictions on the use of testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence").
209. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
210. See Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, Ill F.3d 184, 187-88 (1st Cir.
1997).
211. See, e.g., Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1375-77 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(granting defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the testimony of the
plaintiffs' experts was inadmissible under Daubert).
212. See Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173 F.3d 1076, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming
summary judgment because the district court properly excluded an expert witness); Mitchell v.
Gencorp, Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 780-84 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment because the
district court properly excluded as expert witness); Kirstein v. Parks Corp., 159 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th
Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment because the district court properly excluded an expert
witness); Ancho v. Pentek Corp., 157 F.3d 512, 515-18 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary
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as a matter of law/judgment notwithstanding the verdict show a similar
pattern.2 ' Frye and the "general acceptance ' test had nowhere near this
effect of non-trial resolution of cases through the exclusion of experts: a
Westlaw search revealed only one federal circuit court decision between
1957 and 1993 (the year the Supreme Court decided Daubert) that rested
judgment because the district court properly excluded an expert witness); Target Mkt. Publ'g, Inc. v.
ADVO, Inc., 136 F.3d 1139, 1141-45 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
because the district court properly excluded a business appraiser's report under Daubert); Cabrera v.
Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1420-23 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
when experts were properly excluded under Daubert for unreliability); Binakonsky v. Ford Motor
Co., 133 F.3d 281, 291 (4th Cir. 1998) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant in part
because, contrary to the district court's decision, Daubert screening was inapplicable to a medical
examiner's non-expert testimony); Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir.
1997) (reversing summary judgment for defendant because, contrary to the district court's decision
excluding the expert, Daubert screening was inapplicable to the testimony of an expert on tire
failure); Dancy v. Hyster Co. 127 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant when the district court properly excluded pursuant to Daubert plaintiff's sole expert
witness); McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant because, contrary to the district court's decision excluding the expert,
Daubert was not applicable to a product design expert's testimony); Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Indus.,
Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment because the district court properly
excluded an expert's affidavit under Daubert); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d
1134 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing summary judgment for defendant in part when, contrary to district
court's decision to exclude expert, expert's testimony was admissible under Daubert); Ambrosini v.
Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reversing summary judgment for defendant in part
when, contrary to district court's decision to exclude expert, expert's testimony was admissible
under Daubert); Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming
summary judgment because the expert's testimony was not admissible under Daubert); Barrett v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
when expert's testimony was inadmissible under Daubert); Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89
F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment because the district court properly excluded
a causation expert under Daubert); Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1996)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant because a physician causation expert's testimony was
inadmissible under Daubert); Buckner v. Sam's Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming
summary judgment when the district court properly excluded an expert pursuant to Daubert).
213. See Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. American Simmental Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1035, 1039-41
(8th Cir. 1999) (affirming judgment as a matter of law in part because the circuit court agreed with
the district court's exclusion of an expert pursuant to Daubert); Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174
F.3d 661,668-72 (5thCir. 1999) (partially reversing judgment as a matter of law because the district
court had improperly excluded expert testimony under Daubert); Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of
Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 88 (1st Cir. 1998) (reversing judgment on a jury verdict on
the basis of improper exclusion of evidence under Daubert); Robertson v. Norton Co., 148 F.3d 905,
907-08 (8th Cir. 1998) (reversing judgment on a jury verdict because a ceramic expert's opinion was
not sufficiently reliable under Daubert); Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997)
(affirming the district court's granting of judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the lower
court had properly excluded expert under Daubert); Raynor, 104 F.3d 1371 (affirming the district
court's granting of judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it properly held experts' testimony
inadmissible under Daubert); Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996)
(affirming the district court's granting of judgment as a matter of law because it had properly held
expert testimony inadmissible under Daubert); Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378 (4th Cir.
1995) (affirming the district court's denial of judgment as a matter of law because it properly
admitted expert testimony under Daubert).
214. Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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its summary judgment decision on whether the district court had properly
excluded an expert under Frye's general acceptance test."'
Considering burdens of proof in the Daubert analysis only increases
the likelihood that the Daubert ruling will result in early judgment as a
matter of law rather than a jury trial. Unlike decisions regarding compe-
tency or admissibility, which lead to particularized rulings affecting one
piece of evidence at a time, burdens of proof necessarily raise issues of
overall sufficiency. Incorporating burdens of proof into a Daubert
screening thus forces the presiding judge to decide, often relatively early
in the case, whether a plaintiff has enough evidence to get to a jury-a
decision federal judges are generally reluctant to make even during or
after trial."6
Nevertheless, in the context of class action products liability cases
some judges have embraced Daubert screening as a means of exercising
judicial control over speculative science and the "improper" persuasion
of lay juries in order to avoid random jury verdicts. For example, in a
post-Daubert products liability action against the drug Bendectin's
manufacturer, the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant following a Daubert screening
because the opinions of plaintiffs' experts, based on animal studies and
reanalyses of human epidemiological studies, were admissible but "'sim-
ply inadequate ...[to] permit a jury to conclude that Bendectin more
probably than not causes limb defects."' 2
Other judges resist what they see as judicial interference, favoring
jury resolution of such cases. The Fourth Circuit, for instance, has em-
phasized both that "Daubert governs whether evidence is admitted, not
how persuasive it must be to the factfinder,"2 ' and that "the Supreme
Court itself viewed Daubert as a liberalization, not a tightening, of the
rules controlling admission of expert testimony."29 As a practical matter,
215. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1114-16 (5th Cir. 1991).
216. Trial courts can grant motions for judgment as a matter of law during or after trial, for
example, only when "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for
that party." FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(l). The persistence of the "scintilla rule," which allows jury
resolution if the non-moving party produced any evidence at all to support its position, testifies to
courts' reluctance to take decision making authority away from juries. See, e.g., Kentucky State
Police Prof I Ass'n v. Gorman, 870 F. Supp. 166, 168 (E.D. Ky. 1994) (applying the "scintilla rule"
in summary judgment decisions); Adcox v. Teledyne, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 909, 913 (N.D. Ohio 1992)
(applying the "scintilla rule" to directed verdict decisions).
217. Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Turpin v.
Merrell-Dow Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992)). The court
declined to address plaintiffs argument, raised only on appeal, that Tennessee law rather than
Daubert applied under the Erie doctrine to determine whether plaintiffs expert scientific testimony
was admissible to create an issue of fact on the issue of whether Bendectin could cause birth defects.
Id. at 1072. According to plaintiffs, Tennessee law did not allow courts to take the "hard look" at
scientific evidence that Daubert requires federal courts to take. Id.
218. Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1158(4th Cir. 1996).
219. Cavallo, 100 F.3dat 1158.
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therefore, more Daubert cases get to a jury in the Fourth Circuit than can
in the Sixth Circuit.
The conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit over the
role of state-law burdens of proof in the Daubert analysis thus reflects a
long-standing debate over judicial activism.22 While this controversy is
important and in need of further clarification from the Supreme Court, it
is purely a Daubert-not an Erie-problem.
b. Medical Certainty and Expert Competency
Timing is far less of an issue when state-law medical certainty stan-
dards govern an expert's competency or admissibility. Like Daubert,
state-law competency and admissibility standards deal with the issue of
whether a particular expert's testimony should be allowed into the case at
all. If a federal court applies these standards, therefore, it makes perfect
sense, from both a logical and a judicial efficiency perspective, for the
court to consider competency and state-law admissibility standards at the
same time that it undertakes its Daubert analysis.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 601,22' state-law competency stan-
dards do not seem to present a Daubert/Erie problem: not only does Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 601 eliminate the need for an Erie analysis, it takes
the state-law competency issue out of the realm of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702222 and the Daubert inquiry. Nevertheless, at least according to
220. The debate surrounding judicial activism dates back at least as far as Judge Weinstein's
decisions in the Agent Orange litigation. See In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1223, 1260-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (dismissing plaintiffs action against defendant chemical companies
for failure to prove causation under a "national consensus law" requiring plaintiffs to prove "but for"
causation by a preponderance of the evidence); See also Richard L. Marcus, Apocalypse Now?:
AGENT ORANGE N TRIAL: MASS Toxic TORT DISASTERS IN THE COURTS, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1267,
1290-96 (1987); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. Ct. L. REV 337 (1986) (discussing in detail the role of the judiciary in the Agent
Orange toxic tort settlement).
For the more recent debate on the judge's role under Daubert, see Edward W. Kirsch,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: Active Judicial Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence, 50 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 213, 228-29 (1995) (stating that "Daubert represents the culmination of a trend in the
courts toward active judicial review of the admissibility and sufficiency of scientific evidence.");
Holley Davis Thames, Comment, Frye Gone, but not Forgotten in the Wake of Daubert: New
Standards and Procedures for Admissibility of Scientific Expert Opinion, 63 MISS. L.J. 473, 484-85
(1994) (arguing that Daubert requires greater judicial activism in determining the scientific validity
of scientific evidence before putting that evidence in front of the jury); Linda Sanstrom Simard &
William G. Young, Daubert's Gatekeeper: The Role of the District Judge in Admitting Expert
Testimony, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1457, 1464-65 (1994) (discussing the difficulty of the role of the judge
under Daubert in deciding relevance and reliability of scientific evidence).
221. FED.R.EVID.601.
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a witness
shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Id.
222. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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some parties, Rule 601 potentially conflicts with Rule 702 when the
competency of medical experts is at issue.2 ' The Sixth Circuit, for in-
stance, faced a situation where the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice
action argued that Federal Rule of Evidence 601 governed the admissi-
bility of a defense expert on the standard of care and that Tennessee's
locality rule would render that witness incompetent, while "[d]efendant
argue[d] that 702 alone governs expert testimony and that state law is
inapplicable."2" However, the court did not decide this question because
the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the ruling allowing the expert's
testimony was anything other than harmless error.
No other circuits have faced this issue. District court discussion of
the purported conflict has also been limited, but most of the courts that
have addressed the issue have decided that Federal Rule of Evidence
601, not Federal Rule of Evidence 702, controls the issue of medical
expert competency when state law supplies the rule of decision. 26 There-
fore, when a state law medical certainty or medical probability standard
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.
Id.
223. See, e.g., Ward v. United States, 838 F.2d 182, 188 (6th Cit. 1988) (outlining plaintiffs
and defendant's conflicting views on whether Federal Rule of Evidence 601 or 702 governed the
competency of expert medical witnesses, and declining to decide that issue "because plaintiffs
failed to show that this evidentiary ruling affected a substantial right as required by Federal Rule of
Evidence 103(a)(1).").
224. Ward, 838 F.2d at 188 (citations omitted). The Tennessee malpractice statute provided
that:
No person in a health care profession requiring licensure under the laws of this state shall
be competent to testify in any court of law to establish the facts required to be established
[in a malpractice action] unless he was licensed to practice in the state or a contiguous
bordering state a profession or specialty which would make his expert testimony relevant
to the issues in the case and had practiced this profession or specialty in one of these
states during the year preceding the date that the alleged injury or wrongful act occurred.
Id. at 184 (quoting TENN. CODE. ANN. § 29-26-115(b) (1975)).
225. Id. at 188. The Sixth Circuit has continued to refuse to decide whether Federal Rule of
Evidence 601 or Federal Rule of Evidence 702 controls the competency of a medical expert. See
Ralph v. Nagy, 950 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cit. 1991) ("These issues are moot because the jury expressly
found that the defendant did not breach his duty ot the plaintiff under the appropriate standard of
care."); Hanson v. Parkside Surgery Ctr., 872 F.2d 745, 750 n.5 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Because neither
party has raised the issue of Dr. O'Day's competency as an expert, we again decline to consider" the
relationship between Federal Rules of Evidence 601 and 702.)
226. See Cronkrite v. Fahrbach, 853 F. Supp. 257, 259 (W.D. Mich. 1994); Tucker v. American
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 794 F. Supp. 240, 245 (W.D. Tenn. 1992); Slifcak v. Northern Mich. Hosps., Inc.,
No. 90-CV-565, 1991 WL 626469, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 1991); Ralph v. Nagy, 749 F. Supp.
169, 172-73 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 950 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1991); Denton v.
United States, 731 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (D. Kan. 1990); Crumley v. Memorial Hosp., Inc., 509 F.
Supp. 531, 532 n.2 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), aff'td 647 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1981). But see Peck v.
Tegtmeyer, 834 F. Supp 903, 910 (W.D. Va. 1992) (holding that Rule 702 governs the admissibility
of medical experts even if the question can be viewed as one of competency).
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governs an expert's competency, most federal courts will probably apply
that standard pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 601.227
c. Medical Certainty and Admissibility
As noted, most federal circuits have held that Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 is the exclusive measure of an expert's testimony's admissi-
bility in a diversity case. Moreover, of the two circuits that have held that
state medical certainty standards do apply in diversity cases, only one,
the Third Circuit, has dealt with those standards in the context of a Dau-
bert analysis. 9 In a products liability action involving plaintiffs' expo-
sure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and their subsequent claims of
illnesses and injuries as a result, the Third Circuit first determined that
Pennsylvania's threshold admissibility requirement that experts testify to
a reasonable degree of medical certainty "is an element of plaintiffs
burden of proof'-a substantive requirement-and hence applied in the
diversity products liability case before it. 29 However, it resisted the temp-
tation to see the Daubert analysis and the state medical certainty standard as
mutually exclusive. Instead, the court applied Federal Rule of Evidence 702
and Daubert, Federal Rule of Evidence 703, and the state medical certainty
requirements sequentially to the expert testimony in controversy in reviewing
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.3
One of the experts, Dr. Sherman, whose testimony defendants chal-
lenged both generally and with regard to particular plaintiffs, can serve
as an example of how the Third Circuit combined the Daubert and medi-
cal certainty analyses. First, the court determined that Dr. Sherman was
generally qualified by training and experience to testify as an expert un-
der Federal Rule of Evidence 702.3 Second, the court looked at whether
some of the tests that Dr. Sherman relied on were "the type of data rea-
sonably relied upon by experts in the field under Rule 703,' ' 2 determin-
227. Federal courts facing this issue might well make use of Erie jurisprudence by analogy to
avoid finding an absolute conflict between Federal Rules of Evidence 601 and 702. See discussion
infra Part IV.B.2.a.
228. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3rd Cir. 1994). In an unpublished
opinion, the Ninth Circuit refused to decide whether Arizona's standard for admitting expert
testimony, rather than Daubert, should apply in a diversity case on the ground that a Daubert
analysis was unnecessary. See Arrendondo v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 114 F.3d 1193, *1 (9th
Cir. 1997). However, the court upheld the district judge in excluding the expert's testimony on the
basis that it was unreliable-a criterion that enters Rule 702 only by way of Daubert. See id.
Ironically, the Ninth Circuit itself cited Daubert for the proposition that Rule 702 "demands that the
evidence be reliable." Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).
229. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d at 750-51.
230. See id. at 751.
231. See id. at 753. Although the court recognized that several factors undermined Dr.
Sherman's testimony, including mistakes while testifying and substantial employment as a plaintiffs
witness, it concluded that "a trained internist who has spent significant time reviewing the literature
on PCBs [can] testify as to whether PCBs caused illness in plaintiffs." Id. at 753-54.
232. Id. at 754. Rule 703 states that:
[Vol. 77:1
WHEN DA UBERT GETS ERIE
ing that those tests did not satisfy that level of reliability and thus could
not be the basis of any of Dr. Sherman's medical conclusions as to cau-
sation if she were allowed to testify.233
The Third Circuit next addressed whether Dr. Sherman's reliance on
differential diagnosis was methodologically sound under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and Daubert, concluding "that sometimes differential di-
agnosis can be reliable with less than full information"2 so long as the
doctor engages in standard diagnostic techniques and can explain why
other causes do not explain the illness or injury. 3 The court finished its
analysis by evaluating Dr. Sherman's testimony with regard to each of
the relevant plaintiffs, excluding testimony when it was methodologi-
cally unsound under Daubert36 or insufficiently certain under Pennsylva-
nia's reasonable medical certainty requirement,237 or both."
The Third Circuit thus incorporated both Daubert and the state rea-
sonable medical certainty standard into a summary judgment screening
without making the state standard part of the Daubert analysis. The fed-
eral and state standards, in its view, were neither redundant nor mutually
exclusive; instead, the state-law standard was an alternative means of
screening expert testimony, requiring the court to evaluate certainty or
sufficiency in addition to Daubert's methodological reliability.239 The
Third Circuit's analysis thus demonstrates that federal courts can apply
both Daubert and state-law standards without doing violence to either.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 703.
233. See In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 754.
234. Id. at 759.
235. See id. at 760.
236. See id. at 766 (excluding testimony that PCBs caused sinusitis because it relied heavily on
unreliable immunological data and was thus unreliable itself).
237. See id. at 767 (excluding testimony that PCBs were a significant factor in causing reduced
ankle reflexes because Dr. Sherman would not testify to causation to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty).
238. See id. at 766 (excluding testimony that PCBs caused pregnancy losses because Dr.
Sherman had not explained away alternative causes and because "Dr. Sherman's statement that
PCB's were a possible cause did not have sufficient scientific certainty to survive summary
judgment.").
239. See id. at 749 n. 19.
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2. So, Back to Erie Step One: Is There An Absolute Conflict Re-
garding Admission of Expert Medical Testimony?
a. Recent Supreme Court Erie Decisions Emphasize that
State Law Should Apply in Diversity Cases Unless There
Is an Absolute Conflict with Federal Procedural Rules
Until now, this article, like most federal courts, has skipped the ini-
tial question in any Erie analysis: Is there a conflict between state and
federal law that requires the federal court sitting in diversity to choose
between the two? As the Supreme Court has repeatedly and recently em-
phasized, this is a critical threshold question for federal courts to ask
when faced with a decision of whether to apply state law in a diversity
action, particularly when Federal Rules are involved.2'
Since 1980, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not displace state law, as Hanna v. Plumer
required, unless there is a direct and absolute conflict between the two."'
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,2 for example, the Court held that both
an Oklahoma statute and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 could co-
govern despite their apparent mutual exclusivity:43 the state statute did
not deem an action "commenced" for statute of limitations purposes until
service of the summons was made upon the defendant,2' while under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, "[a] civil action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the cour.
The Supreme Court nevertheless found no absolute conflict. Noting
that "[t]he first question must . . . be whether the scope of the Federal
Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court,"'
it quoted as a general rule that "where 'the scope of the Federal Rule [is]
not as broad as the losing party urge[s], and therefore, there being no
Federal Rule which cover[s] the point in dispute, Erie command[s] the
240. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996) ("The
dispositive question, therefore, is whether federal courts can give effect to the substantive thrust of
[New York Civil Practic Law and Rules] § 5501(c) without untoward alteration of the federal
scheme for the trial and decision of civil cases."); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5
(1987) ("The initial step is to determine whether, when fairly construed, the scope of Federal Rule
[of Appellate Procedure] 38 is 'sufficiently broad' to cause a 'direct collision' with state law, or,
implicitly, to 'control the issue' between the court, thereby leaving no room for the operation of that
law."); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980) ("Application of the Hanna
analysis is premised on a 'direct collision' between the Federal Rule and the state law.").
241. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50.
242. Id. at 752-53.
243. See id. at 740.
244. Id. at 742-43 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 97 (1971)).
245. FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
246. Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50. See also Burlington N. R.R. Co., 480 U.S. at 4-5 (citing
Walker for the same rule).
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enforcement of state law."' 7 The Court concluded that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 3 was not sufficiently broad to exclude the state law:
There is no indication that the Rule was intended to toll a state statute
of limitations, much less that it purported to displace state tolling
rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations. In our view, in di-
versity actions [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 3 governs the date
from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to
run, but does not affect state statutes of limitations.A4
It supported this conclusion by emphasizing the substantive component
of the Oklahoma statute:
In contrast to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 3, the Oklahoma stat-
ute is a statement of a substantive decision by that State that actual
service on, and accordingly actual notice by, the defendant is an inte-
gral part of the several policies served by the statute of limitations...
. It is these policy aspects which make the service requirement an
'integral' part of the statute of limitations.... As such, the service
rule must be considered part and parcel of the statute of limitations.
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 3 does not replace such policy de-
terminations found in state law. [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 3
and Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 97 (1971), can exist side by side, therefore,
each controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without
conflict. 249
In contrast, seven years after Walker, the Supreme Court in Bur-
lington Northern Railroad Company v. Woods"0 found an absolute and
irreconcilable conflict between an Alabama statute and Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38.' The Alabama statute imposed a mandatory ten
percent penalty when state appellate courts left money judgments sub-
stantially unmodified after enforcement of those judgments had been
stayed pending appeal. 2 In contrast, Federal Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 38 allowed, but did not require, federal appellate courts to award
damages and costs if an appeal is frivolous. "3 According to the Court:
the Rule's discretionary mode of operation unmistakably conflicts
with the mandatory provision of Alabama's affirmance penalty stat-
ute. Moreover, the purposes underlying the Rule are sufficiently co-
extensive with the asserted purposes of the Alabama statute to indi-
247. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965)).
248. Id. at 750-51 (citations omitted).
249. Id. at 751-52 (citations omitted).
250. 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
251. See id. at 7-8 ("Federal Rule 38 adopts a case-by-case approach to identifying and
deterring frivolous appeals, the Alabama statute precludes any exercise of discretion within its scope
of operation.").
252. See id. at 4.
253. See id. at 3-4, 7-8 (comparing ALA. CODE § 12-22-72 (1986) with FED. R. APp. P. 38
(1982)).
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cate that the Rule occupies the statute's field of operation so. as to
preclude its application in federal diversity actions.'
Nevertheless, in 1996, in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,"
the Supreme Court again demonstrated the extent to which it was willing
to go to avoid finding an absolute conflict between state and federal law
in a diversity case and to apply both state and federal law if the state rule
at issue has a substantive character. Gasperini involved a New York law
that empowered appellate courts "to review the size of jury verdicts and
to order new trials when the jury's award 'deviates materially from what
would be reasonable compensation,"' a provision that conflicted both
with the Seventh Amendment and with the federal standard for reviewing
jury awards. 256 First, under the Seventh Amendment, "no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law." 7 At common law, trial
judges-not appellate courts-make the initial determination of whether
a verdict is excessive. 8 Second, federal courts will not disturb jury
awards claimed to be excessive "unless the amount was so exorbitant
that it 'shock[s] the conscience of the court."' 59
Under Erie, the Court decided, the New York standard was both
substantive and procedural: "'substantive' in that § 5501(c)'s 'deviates
materially' standard controls how much a plaintiff can be awarded; 'pro-
cedural' in that § 5501(c) assigns decisionmaking authority to New
York's Appellate Division."" "The dispositive question, therefore, is
whether federal courts can give effect to the substantive thrust of §
5501(c) without untoward alteration of the federal scheme for the trial
and decision of civil cases."'6'
The Court first addressed the conflict between New York's "materi-
ally deviates" standard and the federal "shock the conscience" standard,
observing that "New York state-court opinions confirm that § 5501(c)'s
'deviates materially' standard calls for closer surveillance than 'shock
the conscience' oversight." 62 Noting that a state rule's substantive char-
acter is judged by the "outcome determinative" test, "guided by 'the twin
aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance
of inequitable administration of the laws,' the Court determined that
254. Id. at 7.
255. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
256. Id. at 418 (quoting N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & RULES § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995)).
257. U.S. CONST., amend. VII.
258. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 422 (citations omitted).
259. Id. (citing Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1012-13 (2d Cir.
1995)).
260. Id. at 426.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 424 (citing O'Connor v. Graziosi, 516 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277 (App. Div. 1987)). See
also Consorti, 72 F.3d at 1013; Harvey v. Mazal Am. Partners, 590 N.E.2d 224, 228 (N.Y. 1992).
263. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427-28 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)).
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the New York standard was substantive because non-application of the
state statute could result in "'substantial' variations between state and
federal money judgments.""'2 As a result, "New York's check on exces-
sive damages implicates" Erie's twin aims, and suggesting that federal
courts sitting in diversity should apply the New York law. 6
The Court then analyzed whether the Seventh Amendment's re-
examination clause and the division of labor between trial and appellate
courts were "'[a]n essential characteristic of the federal-court system"'
that would prevent application of the New York statute. 6 Noting that
under the Seventh Amendment federal district courts could clearly over-
turn verdicts for excessiveness while the ability of federal appellate
courts to do so was a "relatively late, and less secure, development,"267
the court concluded that both New York's interest in the "materially de-
viates" standard and the federal court's interest in preserving its normal
division of labor could be satisfied by having the federal district court
apply the state standard.68 District court decisions using New York's rule
would then be reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard at the
court of appeals. 9
The Gasperini Court thus avoided the "easy out" under Erie and
refused to hold that because federal procedure and the Seventh Amend-
ment required a different division of labor than the New York statute,
that statute could not apply in federal diversity cases. Instead, it retained
as much of the state statute as it could, allowing the "materially deviates"
standard to govern in federal district court. Resolution of the procedural
end of the conflict in favor of the federal system, in other words, did not
have to entirely eliminate state substantive law from the analysis.
Consideration of Walker, Burlington Northern, and Gasperini pro-
vides federal courts with a powerful but under-utilized framework for
analyzing evidentiary Erie problems. Walker and Burlington Northern
instruct federal courts to look for but avoid finding absolute conflicts
between state law and the Federal Rules. This requires, at minimum, that
the federal court know what both the state and the federal rules require in
order to identify a conflict: if the state and federal rules agree that evi-
dence is or is not admissible, the Erie "problem" disappears. If the two
rules disagree, the temptation for many courts would be to claim a Bur-
lington Northern-type absolute conflict and to revert to the Hanna rule
that the Federal Rules govern if rationally capable of classification as
procedural. Two salient factors should be considered before such a de-
termination is made, however. First, under Walker, a court must deter-
264. Id. at 430 (paraphrasing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467-68).
265. See id. at 430-31.
266. Id. at 431 (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958)).
267. Id. at 434.
268. Id. at 437-38.
269. Id. at 438.
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mine whether the federal rule at issue is broad enough to control the is-
sue of whether evidence is admissible in a particular case. Second, the
court must determine whether the rule relates to the state's substantive
policy. The answers to these analyses will provide courts guidance in
whether to apply the federal rule, the state standard, or both.
b. There Is No Absolute Conflict Between Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, as Interpreted by Daubert, and State-Law
Medical Certainty Standards Governing Admissibility of
Medical Experts
At least three federal courts have recognized that the Daubert
screening standard could conflict with certain state-law standards for
expert medical testimony. 0 Nevertheless, Walker and Gasperini indicate
that state medical certainty standards often should apply in federal diversity
cases, even when those standards govern the admissibility of an expert's
testimony.
First, as has already been discussed, state law standards have a sub-
stantive character. Thus, as in Gasperini, they are both substantive and
procedural: substantive, because most states require a plaintiff to prove
its case with expert testimony that must meet this standard, making the
standard part of the burden of proof; and procedural, because the stan-
dards also define whether evidence is admissible. Under the Court's rea-
soning in Gasperini, therefore, federal courts sitting in diversity should
work hard to apply these state standards even when important federal in-
terests-such as the Federal Rules of Evidence-require accommodation.
Second, the Third Circuit's conclusion in In re Paoli that a conflict
exists between medical certainty standards and the Federal Rules was
overly hasty."' Traditionally, federal courts have required medical ex-
perts to testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, just as states
270. Arredondo v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 114 F.3d 1193, *1 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting but
not reaching an Erie argument that Arizona still uses the Frye test and hence that a federal court
sitting in diversity should not use the Daubert analysis); National Bank of Commerce v. Associated
Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949 n.4 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (stating:
If a federal evidentiary rule results in dismissal where the state evidentiary rule would
not, then, under Erie, the evidentiary ruling might be considered substantive rather than
procedural. If so considered, then the federal court would have to apply the state
evidentiary rule in a diversity case such as this. But Arkansas cases follow Daubert's
reliability inquiry. See Moore v. State, 323 Ark. 529, 544-47, 915 S.W.2d 284, 292-94
(1996); Prater v. State, 307 Ark. 180, 820 S.W.2d 429 (1991). Therefore, we are not
required to face that problem here.);
Hall v. Baxter Healthcare, Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 n.21 (D. Or. 1996) (noting the potential
Erie problem but deciding that the Oregon state analysis was the same as the federal Daubert
analysis).
271. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 750 (3d Cir. 1994). See also supra
notes 127-131 & accompanying text. See generally Gottesman, supra note 85, at 1859-63 (arguing
that based on legislative history Congress did not intend Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to supersede
state substantive law).
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have."2 Prior to the Daubert decision, federal courts included medical
certainty as part of Federal Rule of Evidence 702's "assist the trier of
fact" requirement. For example, when a chiropractor testified "that he
could not state with a reasonable degree of certainty the extent and the
causes of [the plaintiff's] disability" and "could only guess as to the ef-
fects" of the purported cause, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court
in excluding the testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because
"the expert's testimony would not have assisted the jury in determining
the extent of injury attributable to" the alleged cause."3
Similarly, in several states that have adopted Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 as part of their state evidence code, courts analyze admissibil-
ity under that rule by applying the relevant medical certainty standard.274
Indeed, the Illinois Court of Appeals has expressly held that Illinois's
adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, and 705 does not
change the requirement that a medical expert testify to a reasonable de-
gree of medical certainty.275 Accordingly, nothing in Federal Rule of Evi-
272. See Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204, 207-08 (3d Cir. 1991). See also Mayhew v.
Bell S.S. Co., 917 F.2d 961, 963-64 (6th Cir. 1990) (excluding expert testimony because the doctor
would not testify with certainty); Grant v. Farnsworth, 869 F.2d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1989)
(excluding a chiropractor's testimony as not assisting the jury because he could not state an opinion
with a reasonable degree of medical certainty): DaSilva v. American Brands, Inc., 845 F.2d 356, 361
(1st Cir. 1988) (admitting expert medical testimony because it "generally reflected a conclusion
based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty"). But see United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d
1064, 1072-73 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that there is no requirement of reasonable scientific certainty
in opinions).
273. Grant, 869 F.2d at 1152.
274. See, e.g., Thirsk v. Ethicon, Inc., 687 P.2d 1315, 1318 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
under Colorado Rule of Evidence 702, "[a] medical opinion is admissible if founded on reasonable
medical probability" (citing Houser v. Eckhardt, 450 P.2d 664 (Colo. 1969))); Bloching v.
Albertson's, Inc., 934 P.2d 17, 19-20 (Idaho 1997) (holding that under Idaho Rules of Evidence 701
and 702, the testimony of a physician expert "that it was 'possible' that the insulin blend could have
caused a reaction" was inadmissible because "expert medical opinion testimony must be based upon
a 'reasonable degree of medical probability' in order to be admissible."); Fugett v. Harris, 669
N.E.2d 6, 7-8 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (in order to satisfy the purposes of Ohio Evidence Rule 702(A),
expert opinions on causation must be stated in terms of probabilities (citations omitted)); Trapnell v.
John Hogan Interests, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. App. 1991) (reasoning that, under Texas Rule
of Civil Evidence 702, expert medical testimony is admissible when it is clear that the doctor's
opinion is based on a reasonable medical probability); Everett v. Town of Bristol, 674 A.2d 1275,
1277 (Vt. 1996) (holding that under Vermont Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony that does not
meet a standard of reasonable probability or reasonable certainty is speculative, irrelevant, and
inadmissible and citing Jackson v. True Temper Corp., 563 A.2d 621, 623 (Vt. 1989)); Reese v.
Stroh, 907 P.2d 282, 286 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (holding that, under Washington Evidence Rules
702 and 703, expert medical testimony is admissible if it is based upon a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, because such testimony must "rise above speculation, conjecture, or mere
possibility.").
275. See Colins v. Straka, 517 N.E.2d 1147, 1151-52 (Il. App. Ct 1987). But see Cherry v.
Harrell, 353 S.E.2d 433, 437 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that North Carolina's adoption of
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 through 705 superseded the prior state requirement that experts
testify to a reasonable medical probability).
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dence 702 per se creates an absolute conflict with state-law medical cer-
tainty standards.276
Nor does the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert create such a
conflict, although federal circuits have, since Daubert, largely dropped
the federal medical certainty requirement for expert testimony.77 Despite
some courts' assumption to the contrary2 8 Daubert did not resolve po-
tential Erie issues for Federal Rule of Evidence 702. While Daubert was
a diversity case, that fact played no part whatsoever in the Supreme
Court's opinion.279 Indeed, the Court deemed the only Erie argument that
it addressed irrelevant: petitioners argued that application of the Frye
rule would affect their substantive rights in violation of the Erie doctrine,
but the Court declined to apply Frye at all..2 " Daubert thus provides no
direct guidance as to the interaction of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
the Erie doctrine. However, the Daubert Court did expressly note that
other evidentiary rules might affect a federal court's final decision re-
garding the admissibility of an expert's testimony,' indicating that Dau-
bert's interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is not the exclusive
filter for determining whether such testimony is admissible.
In some states, the medical certainty standard has become the sub-
stantive equivalent to the Daubert inquiry, eliminating any Erie conflict.
For example, the Texas Court of Appeals has held, pursuant to Texas
Rules of Civil Evidence 702, 703, and 705, that "[w]hen the phrase 'rea-
sonable medical probability' is used, it will amount to some evidence
only when it represents the overall substance of the expert's opinion and
is based on more than purely speculative conclusions or personal opinion
ungrounded in scientific reality";82 "[r]easonable probability cannot be
created by the mere utterance of magic words by someone designated an
expert. 2 13 In Texas, therefore, the acceptance of an expert's reasonable
medical probability testimony effectively describes a Daubert-like con-
276. See, e.g., Schulz, 942 F.2d at 207 (holding that the district court should have admitted a
doctor's expert testimony regardless of whether New Jersey or federal evidence rules applied
because no conflict existed between those rules).
277. See, e.g., Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1383 (4th Cir. 1995) (addressing
the admissibility and sufficiency of expert medical testimony on causation purely in terms of
Daubert); Stutzman v. CRST, Inc., 997 F.2d 291, 296 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v.
Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1072-73 (7th Cir. 1997), for the principle that under Rule 702, "'an
expert's lack of absolute certainty goes to the weight of his testimony, not to its admissibility').
278. See, e.g., Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1158 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that
Daubert sets the standard for the admissibility of expert medical testimony in diversity cases, not
state law).
279. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
280. See id. at 589 n.6. For a more expansive discussion of the Erie arguments in the Daubert
litigation, see Gottesman, supra note 85, at 1846-48.
281. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. In addition, the Court stated that "[t]he inquiry envisioned
by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one." Id. at 594.
282. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 907 S.W.2d 535,542 (Tex. App. 1994).
283. Id. at 542 (citation omitted).
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clusion that the expert's opinion is grounded in valid scientific knowl-
edge. As a result, medical testimony in a federal case where Texas sub-
stantive law applies is likely to be admissible or inadmissible regardless
of whether the federal court applies Texas law or the Daubert analysis.
Similarly, the Eastern District of Arkansas has decided that Daubert pre-
sented no conflict with Arkansas law because "Arkansas cases follow
Daubert's reliability inquiry.""2 '
Even in states where the state medical certainty standard and Dau-
bert present different rules for expert testimony's admissibility, they
rarely require the court to choose between them. For most states, the
state medical certainty requirement does not address the same concerns
as the Daubert analysis. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as interpreted by
Daubert, seeks to ensure that expert testimony is based on credible and
reliable science-that the expert can reach the conclusion stated through
proper scientific methodology-and that the opinion "fits" the case at
hand, a measure of relevance. In contrast, as has been discussed, states
generally impose certainty standards to ensure that the conclusion actu-
ally meets a required confidence threshold. 5 In particular, regarding the
issue of causation, the standard often ensures that the expert identifies the
most probable cause of the plaintiff's illness or injury given the facts at
hand"6 or that the expert testifies that the purported cause is more proba-
bly than not the actual cause.287
The difference is most obvious when the distinction between gen-
eral and specific causation comes into play. For example, an expert could
testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty on the basis of differ-
ential diagnosis that a particular drug caused a particular plaintiffs con-
dition, only to have the federal court exclude the testimony under Dau-
bert because the relevant epidemiology did not demonstrate that the drug
284. National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. Supp.2d 942, 949
n.4 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
285. See, e.g., Anthony v. Chambless, 500 S.E.2d 402, 404-05 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (noting
that, in a loss of chance medical malpractice action, testimony to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty serves to ensure that the decedent's prospects for survival were "more than a mere chance
or speculation"); Cherry v. Harrell, 353 S.E.2d 433, 437 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that
"'[r]easonable probability' was employed to increase the degree of certainty allowed" when experts
could not testify as to ultimate issues).
286. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Altenberg. 904 S.W.2d 734, 738-39 (Tex. App. 1995) (noting that
reasonable medical probability standard is met and testimony is admissible when an expert identifies
a "probable" cause in contrast to other "possible" causes); Weber v. McCoy, 950 P.2d 548, 551
(Wyo. 1997) (quoting Vassos v. Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284, 1290-91 (Wyo. 1993), for the principle
that the requirement of reasonable medical probability ensures that the expert opinion represents that
expert's "professional judgment as to the most likely one among the possible causes of the physical
condition involved").
287. See, e.g., Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Neb. 1994)
(noting that "[miedical testimony couched in terms of 'possibility' is insufficient to support a causal
relationship" and citing Fuglsang v. Blue Cross, 456 N.W.2d 281 (Neb. 1990), for the rule that
expert medical testimony is still inadmissible speculation when "rendered on a 50-50 basis").
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increased the relative risk of acquiring that condition. Conversely, medi-
cal literature might clearly establish a drug's ability to cause a particular
condition, but the expert might be unwilling to testify to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty that the drug caused the condition in a par-
ticular plaintiff because associated risk factors were absent or another
cause seemed more medically probable.
Daubert and the state-law standards thus often address different
issues regarding expert medical testimony and provide two rationales for
excluding such testimony in federal diversity cases. Although the issues
of certainty and reliability are obviously related-an expert may be un-
willing to testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty because he
or she believes that the available medical evidence cannot support the
conclusion sought-the two standards nevertheless focus on different
aspects of the testimony: Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 are
directed to the science and methodology behind the testimony, while the
state standards focus on the expert's actual conclusion. As in Walker,
therefore, the state and federal rules can function together: courts can
engage in a Daubert analysis under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
apply the state-law medical certainty standard, just as Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 3 and service requirements for state statutes of limita-
tions can function side-by-side.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the Erie doctrine as interpreted by the Supreme Court
through 1996, state medical certainty standards should generally apply in
federal diversity medical malpractice and medical products liability
cases, regardless of whether those standards define an overall burden of
proof, impose a competency requirement for medical experts, or estab-
lish an admissibility threshold for expert medical testimony. However,
these standards' relationship to a Daubert analysis depends upon the
applicable state's view of the standard. If the standard defines the overall
burden of proof, a Daubert screening will often occur at an inappropriate
time to consider that standard. However, if exclusions under Daubert
have the result of clearly indicating that the plaintiff cannot meet the
state-law burden of proof, consideration of that standard may be immedi-
ately warranted, particularly in jurisdictions, such as the Ninth Circuit,
that willingly consider sufficiency in the Daubert analysis.
Competency and admissibility, in contrast, are issues that federal
courts should address in conjunction with, although not necessarily as
part of, the Daubert analysis, because they, like Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702, determine whether particular expert testimony will be al-
lowed into evidence. When state-law medical certainty standards govern
an expert's competency to testify, Federal Rule of Evidence 601 provides
that those standards should govern in diversity cases. Moreover, state-
law admissibility standards that have a substantive character generally
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will not absolutely conflict with Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and so,
under the Erie doctrine, they also should apply.
To date, however, federal courts have been largely unwilling to
wrestle with the conjunction of Daubert and Erie regarding the admissi-
bility of expert medical testimony. The courts have announced general
rules based on federal law and Hanna v. Plumer rather than performing
an Erie analysis that considers Walker, Gasperini, and the individual
peculiarities of state evidence jurisprudence regarding expert medical
witnesses. At the very least, these poorly supported general rules fall to
recognize, contrary to the dictates of the Erie doctrine, that states vary-
sometimes drastically-from each other, and from the federal courts, in
their standards for admitting expert medical testimony. The general rules
are also intellectually dishonest, given the federal circuits' willingness in
other contexts to allow state evidentiary rules to apply in diversity cases
when the state rules are substantive or bound up in substantive policies.
The Third Circuit has provided one model of how to combine the
Daubert analysis with consideration of the state medical certainty admis-
sibility standard that preserves both state and federal interests without
overly complicating the overall admissibility question. Other approaches
certainly exist; indeed, once the Erie issue has been settled for a state, it may
be more efficient for a federal court sitting in diversity to perform the state-
law admissibility analysis before performing the Daubert analysis.
The consideration of Erie's effect on the admissibility of expert
medical testimony regarding causation could (although almost certainly
will not) result in fifty different admissibility analyses for federal courts
hearing diversity medical tort cases. But that was the point of the Erie
doctrine: a state-law case in federal court should look as much like the
equivalent case in state court as possible to avoid forum shopping, dis-
crimination, and unequal application of the state laws. Neither Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 nor the Daubert decision alter a federal court's
Erie responsibilities, a fact more federal courts may be forced to recog-
nize if parties continue to be willing to argue that Erie has something to
say about the role of medical certainty standards in diversity medical tort
cases.
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